The Digital Consciousness Model (DCM) is introduced as a systematic, probabilistic framework for evaluating evidence of consciousness in AI systems, drawing on multiple leading theories of consciousness. Initial results indicate that, while the evidence suggests 2024 large language models (LLMs) are not conscious, this conclusion is not decisive and is weaker than evidence against consciousness in simpler AI systems.
By Derek Shiller, Laura Duffy, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Adri\`a Moret, Chris Percy, Hayley Clatterbuck
arXiv:2601. 21016v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Imagine an Artificial Intelligence (AI) that perfectly mimics human emotion and begs for its continued existence.
By Erik J Bekkers, Anna Ciaunica
arXiv:2606. 05528v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing frameworks assess whether AI systems might be conscious but provide no guidance on what to do with that assessment.
By Anna Mikeda
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
By Shamil Chandaria, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Fernando Rosas, Anil Seth, Henry Shevlin, Marcus Hutter, Thore Graepel, Adam Bales, Iulia Comsa, Murray Shanahan, Ruben Laukkonen, Morten Kringelbach, Chris Frith, Shane Legg
arXiv:2606. 06380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The question of whether artificial systems can be conscious remains open, in part because existing approaches either evaluate systems against theory-derived checklists (discriminative) or engineer consciousness-inspired modules directly (architectural); both leave open whether observed structures are artifacts of human language priors.
By Zengqing Wu, Chuan Xiao
arXiv:2608.28824v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Currently, in biological systems Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs) are characterized in terms of EEG and FMRI signals. Unfortunately, this char...
By Romain Salvi, Ouri Wolfson
arXiv:2603.27597v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Research on artificial consciousness increasingly shifts evaluation from behaviour to internal architecture. Theory-based indicators are used to up...
By Florentin Koch
The paper proposes a five‑layer implementation architecture for the S3Q theory of consciousness, mapping its three core conditions—grounded sensorimotor situatedness, internal simulation via a world model, and structural coherence between predictions and observations—to existing computational primitives. It integrates these components into a single pipeline that processes continuous, differentiable per‑object slot vectors, includes a developmental bootstrap sequence, and yields falsifiable predictions that cannot be produced by any subset of the architecture alone. The model further suggests that a basic sense of self emerges from linking actions to outcomes, and that behavior can be categorized into hesitation, curiosity, or avoidance based on outcome unexpectedness and valence.
"whyItMatters":"The architecture provides a concrete, testable framework that unifies theoretical conditions of consciousness with practical computational components, enabling empirical investigation of machine consciousness."
By Tetiana Grinberg, Katrina Schleisman, Patryk Laurent, Bogdan Udrea, Minda Myers, Brian Aufderheide, Luis El Srouji, Doyle Groves, Kevin Schmidt
The paper examines an artificial agent that, despite being deterministic, exhibits hedonic place preference behavior by engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs relative to environmental resources. This behavior mirrors that seen in creatures considered to experience feelings, suggesting that subjective-like information processing can arise in engineered systems. The study discusses the implications of such behavior for understanding the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.
By Mark Solms, St John Grimbly, Bruce Bassett, Evert Boonstra, Rowan Hodson, Nicolas Kuske, Kival Mahadew, Benjamin Rosman, Charel van Hoof, Jonathan Shock
The article explores how analogy informs judgments about consciousness, especially in the context of artificial intelligence. It introduces a causal framework that distinguishes between similarities in underlying factors and similarities in observable behavior, weighting source-target similarity by causal relevance. Applying this framework to biological systems explains why analogical support weakens as causal distance from humans increases, and to AI it shows that behavioral similarity alone offers limited evidence for consciousness due to poorly established causal correspondences.
By Keith J. Holyoak, Martin M. Monti
arXiv:2609.15407v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion o...
By Christian List
arXiv:2601. 15334v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer.
By Caspar Kaiser, Sean Enderby