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arXiv AI By Keith J. Holyoak, Martin M. Monti

What Can Analogy Tell Us About Artificial Consciousness?

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The article explores how analogy informs judgments about consciousness, especially in the context of artificial intelligence. It introduces a causal framework that distinguishes between similarities in underlying factors and similarities in observable behavior, weighting source-target similarity by causal relevance. Applying this framework to biological systems explains why analogical support weakens as causal distance from humans increases, and to AI it shows that behavioral similarity alone offers limited evidence for consciousness due to poorly established causal correspondences.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

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