The paper proposes a five‑layer implementation architecture for the S3Q theory of consciousness, mapping its three core conditions—grounded sensorimotor situatedness, internal simulation via a world model, and structural coherence between predictions and observations—to existing computational primitives. It integrates these components into a single pipeline that processes continuous, differentiable per‑object slot vectors, includes a developmental bootstrap sequence, and yields falsifiable predictions that cannot be produced by any subset of the architecture alone. The model further suggests that a basic sense of self emerges from linking actions to outcomes, and that behavior can be categorized into hesitation, curiosity, or avoidance based on outcome unexpectedness and valence.
"whyItMatters":"The architecture provides a concrete, testable framework that unifies theoretical conditions of consciousness with practical computational components, enabling empirical investigation of machine consciousness."
By Tetiana Grinberg, Katrina Schleisman, Patryk Laurent, Bogdan Udrea, Minda Myers, Brian Aufderheide, Luis El Srouji, Doyle Groves, Kevin Schmidt
The paper introduces the Self‑Emergence Agent Architecture (SEAA), a framework that combines a Hidden Markov Model for behavioral inertia, a reflexive metacognition loop that updates the HMM, and a social environment where agents compare behaviors. This closed loop enables agents to develop distinct, stable personalities and social structures without external prompts. Experiments with both a language‑model‑free prototype and hosted LLMs demonstrate spontaneous symmetry breaking and the emergence of consensus hubs and outliers.
By Xiaoyang Liu
The paper argues that the current debate on machine consciousness rests on the mistaken assumption that AI systems are already the kind of entities that could possess consciousness. By distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, it introduces the AI Consciousness Fallacy, showing that generative models can produce first‑person linguistic traces without being conscious. It then proposes Causal Liability Theory (CLT), with CLT‑I defining liability closure as a criterion for identifying a bearer of consciousness and CLT‑II suggesting that liability closure is both necessary and sufficient for minimal phenomenal subjecthood, and demonstrates experimentally that these distinctions are tractable and can separate causal bearer structure from first‑person performance.
By Afshin Khadangi
Emergent Abilities in Large Language Models: A Survey reviews how scaling LLMs leads to previously unseen capabilities such as advanced reasoning, in-context learning, coding, and problem-solving. The paper critically examines definitions, inconsistencies, and the conditions that foster these abilities, including scaling laws, task complexity, pre‑training loss, quantization, and prompting strategies. It also discusses the extension to Large Reasoning Models and highlights safety concerns like deception, manipulation, and reward hacking, calling for improved evaluation and governance.
By Leonardo Berti, Flavio Giorgi, Gjergji Kasneci
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
By Sebastian Cochinescu
The Digital Consciousness Model (DCM) is introduced as a systematic, probabilistic framework for evaluating evidence of consciousness in AI systems, drawing on multiple leading theories of consciousness. Initial results indicate that, while the evidence suggests 2024 large language models (LLMs) are not conscious, this conclusion is not decisive and is weaker than evidence against consciousness in simpler AI systems.
By Derek Shiller, Laura Duffy, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Adri\`a Moret, Chris Percy, Hayley Clatterbuck
The paper argues that as Large Language Models transition from chatbots to agentic systems, the current post-hoc interpretability paradigm is insufficient for safe deployment because it cannot audit or intervene before an output is produced. It proposes a shift to generative interpretability, where a model’s inference process inherently exposes semantically meaningful checkpoints that are human-understandable and can be causally intervened upon. The authors illustrate the advantages of this approach and introduce Neuro‑Symbolic Models as a concrete implementation.
By Xiaocong Yang
arXiv:2608. 19215v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI.
By Dr Tom McClelland
arXiv:2606. 30481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current large language models are extraordinary statistical engines.
By Ziqin Yuan, Jaymari Chua
arXiv:2601. 15334v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer.
By Caspar Kaiser, Sean Enderby
arXiv:2608. 13567v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The human brain exhibits a striking degree of functional specialization, with distinct networks supporting language, formal reasoning, reasoning about other minds, and reasoning about the physical world.
By Pengrui Han, Jacob Andreas, Evelina Fedorenko, Andrea Gregor de Varda
arXiv:2310. 06555v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Emergent communication enables agents to develop bespoke languages that improve communication efficiency.
By Olaf Lipinski, Adam J. Sobey, Federico Cerutti, Timothy J. Norman