The Digital Consciousness Model (DCM) is introduced as a systematic, probabilistic framework for evaluating evidence of consciousness in AI systems, drawing on multiple leading theories of consciousness. Initial results indicate that, while the evidence suggests 2024 large language models (LLMs) are not conscious, this conclusion is not decisive and is weaker than evidence against consciousness in simpler AI systems.
By Derek Shiller, Laura Duffy, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Adri\`a Moret, Chris Percy, Hayley Clatterbuck
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
By Shamil Chandaria, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Fernando Rosas, Anil Seth, Henry Shevlin, Marcus Hutter, Thore Graepel, Adam Bales, Iulia Comsa, Murray Shanahan, Ruben Laukkonen, Morten Kringelbach, Chris Frith, Shane Legg
arXiv:2606. 06380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The question of whether artificial systems can be conscious remains open, in part because existing approaches either evaluate systems against theory-derived checklists (discriminative) or engineer consciousness-inspired modules directly (architectural); both leave open whether observed structures are artifacts of human language priors.
By Zengqing Wu, Chuan Xiao
arXiv:2606. 15348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet.
By Ryota Kanai, Shuqin Ma
arXiv:2608.28824v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Currently, in biological systems Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs) are characterized in terms of EEG and FMRI signals. Unfortunately, this char...
By Romain Salvi, Ouri Wolfson
arXiv:2606. 05528v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing frameworks assess whether AI systems might be conscious but provide no guidance on what to do with that assessment.
By Anna Mikeda
The paper proposes a phenomenology-first framework for artificial consciousness, redefining consciousness as the subjective experience produced through an agent’s interface with the world. It models first-person structures mathematically using categories derived from Q-networks, which serve as relational interfaces encoding agent‑world interactions. This approach aligns with 4E cognition theories—enactive, embedded, and extended—and offers a rigorous, categorical account of how computational systems can embed information processing into phenomenological structure.
By Robert Prentner
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
By Sebastian Cochinescu
arXiv:2507. 05169v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: World Model, the algorithmic simulator of the real-world environment which biological agents experience and act upon, has been an emerging topic in recent years due to the rising need to develop virtual agents with artificial (general) intelligence.
By Eric Xing, Mingkai Deng, Jinyu Hou
arXiv:2608. 19215v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI.
By Dr Tom McClelland
arXiv:2511. 14555v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Decoded Neurofeedback (DecNef) is a promising non-invasive approach to brain modulation with wide-ranging applications in neuromedicine and cognitive neuroscience.
By Alexander Olza, Roberto Santana, David Soto
arXiv:2606. 30481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current large language models are extraordinary statistical engines.
By Ziqin Yuan, Jaymari Chua