arXiv:2606. 15348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet.
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
The paper proposes a five‑layer implementation architecture for the S3Q theory of consciousness, mapping its three core conditions—grounded sensorimotor situatedness, internal simulation via a world model, and structural coherence between predictions and observations—to existing computational primitives. It integrates these components into a single pipeline that processes continuous, differentiable per‑object slot vectors, includes a developmental bootstrap sequence, and yields falsifiable predictions that cannot be produced by any subset of the architecture alone. The model further suggests that a basic sense of self emerges from linking actions to outcomes, and that behavior can be categorized into hesitation, curiosity, or avoidance based on outcome unexpectedness and valence. "whyItMatters":"The architecture provides a concrete, testable framework that unifies theoretical conditions of consciousness with practical computational components, enabling empirical investigation of machine consciousness."
arXiv:2605. 26856v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We propose the Sensation Modulating Network (SMN): the cognitive agent as the whole body, organized at every scale by opponent dynamics, built from Sensation Modulators -- tissue that senses and acts through one substrate -- paired into Coordinated Action Zones routed by a body-wide broadcast.
The paper argues that the current debate on machine consciousness rests on the mistaken assumption that AI systems are already the kind of entities that could possess consciousness. By distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, it introduces the AI Consciousness Fallacy, showing that generative models can produce first‑person linguistic traces without being conscious. It then proposes Causal Liability Theory (CLT), with CLT‑I defining liability closure as a criterion for identifying a bearer of consciousness and CLT‑II suggesting that liability closure is both necessary and sufficient for minimal phenomenal subjecthood, and demonstrates experimentally that these distinctions are tractable and can separate causal bearer structure from first‑person performance.
arXiv:2607. 11958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Under the free energy principle, a predictive system does not observe reality directly; it maintains a generative model of the world and experiences that model's best current hypothesis.
arXiv:2606. 23991v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: What is an agent?
arXiv:2303. 04203v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The theory of computation was built to answer Turing's question: what is effectively calculable by an unbounded, immortal, disembodied agent following rules?
arXiv:2607. 24807v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We develop the mathematical and physical formulation of cognitive cost optimization that underlies the path-integral model of consciousness.
arXiv:2606. 06380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The question of whether artificial systems can be conscious remains open, in part because existing approaches either evaluate systems against theory-derived checklists (discriminative) or engineer consciousness-inspired modules directly (architectural); both leave open whether observed structures are artifacts of human language priors.
arXiv:2608. 02704v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Predictive processing theories portray the brain as a hierarchical prediction engine that minimizes prediction error, yet they lack operational definitions for the structure of a "prediction," the standardized response to a prediction error, and the mechanism that maintains consistency across successive updates.
arXiv:2606. 20231v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Can intelligence be measured?
The paper introduces a framework that distinguishes world models by the channel they represent—environment, agent, or joint agent‑environment—using computational mechanics to define canonical predictive models as ε-transducers or ε-machines. It shows how closed‑loop coupling induces support‑restricted models whose states factor through the joint causal states, and demonstrates with a POMDP example that such restriction can reduce an otherwise infinite‑state environment model to a finite one.