Robust comparisons of federated aggregation methods require joint consideration of predictive performance, threat definitions, metric semantics, and execution provenance. A 500-cell seed-1 evaluation matrix was reconstructed across five aggregation methods, five datasets, five architectures, and four recorded conditions: clean, sign-flipping, Gaussian, and BadNets.
arXiv:2608. 11423v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Robust comparisons of federated aggregation methods require joint consideration of predictive performance, threat definitions, metric semantics, and execution provenance.
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
arXiv:2607. 16357v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security rating platforms summarize externally observable cyber exposure and are expected to help organizations prioritize remediation.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
arXiv:2608. 09624v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Internal safety scores judge a prompt before any text is generated, and they are validated by how well they separate harmful prompts from benign ones.
arXiv:2608. 08008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Process reward models (PRMs) score intermediate reasoning steps and are widely used for search, ranking, and training, but optimization can exploit these learned proxies by increasing reward while turning correct reasoning into incorrect reasoning.
Frontier AI model developers increasingly rely on layered safeguards to prevent catastrophic misuse, but little public evidence exists on how much protection these safeguards provide, or how consistently across developers. We introduce the FAR.
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.
arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
arXiv:2606. 29159v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Offline root-cause-analysis (RCA) benchmarks commonly rank methods by a single pooled top-1 accuracy across multiple subsystems, and engineers often read the pooled winner as a recommendation for their own subsystem.
arXiv:2604. 18245v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models operate in protocols containing multiple calls, yet added calls are usually evaluated only by their net effect.