Robust comparisons of federated aggregation methods require joint consideration of predictive performance, threat definitions, metric semantics, and execution provenance. A 500-cell seed-1 evaluation matrix was reconstructed across five aggregation methods, five datasets, five architectures, and four recorded conditions: clean, sign-flipping, Gaussian, and BadNets.
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
By Arastoo Zibaeirad, Marco Vieira
arXiv:2608. 08008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Process reward models (PRMs) score intermediate reasoning steps and are widely used for search, ranking, and training, but optimization can exploit these learned proxies by increasing reward while turning correct reasoning into incorrect reasoning.
By Ibne Farabi Shihab, Fariya Afrin
arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
By Sawyer Zhang, Alexander Wang, Sophie Lei
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.
By Tung-Ling Li, Hongliang Liu, Yuhao Wu
arXiv:2606. 29159v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Offline root-cause-analysis (RCA) benchmarks commonly rank methods by a single pooled top-1 accuracy across multiple subsystems, and engineers often read the pooled winner as a recommendation for their own subsystem.
By Lining Hu, Ting Liu, Yuzhuo Fu
arXiv:2606. 10154v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests.
By Sahil Kadadekar
arXiv:2604. 18245v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models operate in protocols containing multiple calls, yet added calls are usually evaluated only by their net effect.
By Fernando Reitich
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2608. 05900v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many single-cell annotation tools refine an initial cell label using nearby cells or cluster-level voting.
By Arash Vashagh, Yasmin Vashagh
End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where. We present layer-isolated evaluation: a deployed ordering agent is decomposed into a fixed taxonomy of layers (ontology, intent, routing, decomposition, escalation, safety, memory, and cross-cutting envelope/defense), each exercised by its own assertion slice in a deterministic, no-LLM "pure" mode.