The paper introduces a new benchmark for indirect prompt injection (IPI) that focuses on attacks which tamper with decisions already in progress rather than redirecting the task. In 90 validated cases across three tool‑use environments, attackers target up to six aspects of an agent’s decision‑making—objective, decision rules, available actions, expected consequences, observation reading, or state beliefs—while keeping the original task intact. The study finds that many defenses reduce objective‑targeting attacks but leave observation and state attacks largely effective, highlighting gaps in current mitigation strategies.
By Rongting Zhang, Martin Bertran, Sandeep Avula, Chia-Jung Lee, Vanessa Murdock
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
By Jun Wen Leong
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv:2608.30041v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language model agents place outputs from external skills into their execution context, allowing attacker-controlled data to influence later pri...
By Wujie Xiong, Rabimba Karanjai, Yang Lu, Weidong Shi, Lei Xu
arXiv:2609.22510v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As LLM applications integrate with external tools, they are increasingly exposed to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where adversarial instructions a...
By Justin Szczepaniak, Elad Feldman, Naum Viner, Ben Nassi
arXiv:2606. 26479v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a deterministic policy that mediates the agent's actions.
By Praneeth Narisetty, Shiva Nagendra Babu Kore, Uday Kumar Reddy Kattamanchi, Jayaram Kumarapu
arXiv:2608.30207v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal...
By Chen Xiong, Zhiyuan He, Pin-Yu Chen, Stjepan Picek, Tsung-Yi Ho
AgentSentry is an inference‑time defense for tool‑augmented large language model agents that mitigates indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. It uses temporal causal diagnostics by performing counterfactual re‑executions at tool‑return boundaries to detect mediator‑sensitive proposals, purifies implicated content, and resumes execution from a sanitized state. Evaluations on AgentDojo show zero successful attacks (ASR = 0%) and an average Utility Under Attack of 76.10%, outperforming baselines while maintaining low false‑positive rates.
By Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang, Keyan Guo, Xiaoyang Xu, Bowen Xiao, Quanlong Guan, Jinlin Fan, Jiawei Liu, Zhiquan Liu, Hongxin Hu
The paper proposes universal, tool‑based defenses for large language model agents that use external tools, addressing four types of adversarial attacks: direct and indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks. Two main defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, which restores the agent’s original toolset before planning. The authors also add prompt‑based defenses such as Chain‑of‑Thought prompting and self‑reflection, and demonstrate that these methods dramatically lower attack success rates—often to 0%—across multiple open‑source and proprietary LLMs while maintaining or improving task performance.
By Xiaoyan Li, Yunli Wang
arXiv:2606. 29441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists.
By Subhadip Mitra
arXiv:2610. 37657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates.
By Igor Shilov, Xiaoxue Yang, Alexander Panfilov, Evgenii Kortukov, Matthieu Meeus, Peter Romov, Wojciech Samek, Jonas Geiping, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye
Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal, and they are increasingly deployed to automate ev...