arXiv:2607. 16357v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security rating platforms summarize externally observable cyber exposure and are expected to help organizations prioritize remediation.
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The paper introduces a deterministic AI security risk assessment framework that transforms diverse engineering artefacts into a standardized Control ID taxonomy scored on a four‑level ordinal scale. It compiles technique‑level predicates from a fixed MITRE ATLAS snapshot, linking each control to mitigation and producing traceable feasibility and impact outputs. The framework is formally verified for boundedness, totality, consistency, and monotonicity, and is evaluated on five open‑source AI projects, showing that strengthened controls lower feasibility scores while residual risks persist when core controls are missing.
arXiv:2609.39934v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Checkpoint selection in domain generalization often relies on source-validation accuracy, yet the selected checkpoint need not provide reliable proba...
arXiv:2606. 05710v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The increasing penetrations of the critical infrastructure sector in the United States with intelligent digital technologies have greatly increased exposure to advanced cyber adversaries and operational vulnerabilities.
The paper introduces a diagnostic framework for long‑horizon security LLM agents that uses checkpoints to distinguish failures occurring before and after a model’s capability is exposed, and applies controlled interventions to pinpoint upstream bottlenecks. The methodology is tested on four task families—delayed reuse of discovered information, reuse of observed state, recovery from failed strategies, and decision making after uncertain outcomes—revealing that many failures happen before the agent observes the state it later needs to reuse. Experiments with Gemini 2.5 Flash and Gemini 3.7 Flash show that targeted protocol‑disambiguation guidance can significantly alter state observation rates and that the primary source of failure can shift across model generations, underscoring the need for fine‑grained failure diagnostics rather than relying solely on overall task success.
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
arXiv:2607. 26791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities.