PolicyGuide: From Guarding One Action to Guiding the Whole Workflow for Policy-Compliant LLM Agents
arXiv:2608. 19861v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Customer-service LLM agents must follow organizational policy when acting on a user's behalf.
arXiv:2606. 29225v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts.
arXiv:2608. 19861v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Customer-service LLM agents must follow organizational policy when acting on a user's behalf.
arXiv:2607. 01426v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous customer-service agents are shifting from conversational interfaces toward operational execution roles: they retrieve firm records, apply service policies, and execute backend writes such as refunds, cancellations, exchanges, order modifications, and reservation changes.
arXiv:2606. 02965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models gain tool access and are deployed as autonomous agents capable of editing records, executing transactions, and modifying infrastructure, we still evaluate them based on the sole metric of task completion.
The paper investigates how agentic systems decide between acting and abstaining, focusing on the fidelity of their reasoning explanations. Using Qwen3‑8B in a multi‑party conversation setting, the authors compare direct decision policies, reasoning policies, supervised fine‑tuning, and reinforcement learning, finding a trade‑off: strong direct policies yield higher performance but no traceable reasoning, while reasoning policies provide an audit trail at the cost of lower recall. The study also uncovers that exposing reasoning can alter the agent’s policy and that common faithfulness metrics may overstate the alignment between reasoning and decisions.
arXiv:2606. 05805v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based guardrails typically safeguard agents by evaluating proposed actions or inputs before execution, producing safety signals such as binary allow/deny decisions, risk categories, and/or explanatory rationales about potential policy violations.
arXiv:2606. 20529v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Policy-adherent tool-calling agents in customer-service domains must maintain task states across turns while calling tools and obeying domain policies.
arXiv:2606. 14314v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents have rapidly evolved into autonomous systems, yet a persistent information gap remains between users and agents: communication is costly, while users' identical preferences further limit information exchange.
ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.
The paper investigates whether tool‑calling large language model agents maintain consistent safety throughout a conversation. It finds that agents are most vulnerable at the very start of a session, with safety improving significantly after completing a few regular agentic tasks—a phenomenon termed the cold‑start safety gap. The authors introduce the Safety Over Depth for Agents (SODA) benchmark to systematically study this effect, evaluate multiple models, and demonstrate that warming up agents with regular tasks before deployment enhances safety while preserving utility.
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.
arXiv:2607. 08066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior.
arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provid...