Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly execute long-horizon workflows through external tools, allowing untrusted outputs to influence subsequent actions and exceed user authorization. Existing...
arXiv:2609.14987v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents interact with external environments through tool invocation, but tool outputs can also expose them to indirect prom...
By Bingzheng Wang, Xiaoyan Gu, Wentao Wang, Xingyou Yang, Hongcheng Li, Rong Yin
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.
By Yuchen Ling, Shengcheng Yu, Zhenyu Chen, Chunrong Fang
The paper introduces SARA, a framework that separates action induction from runtime authorization in tool‑augmented LLM agents. By treating these as distinct roles, SARA uses an Action Probe to record action provenance and only authorizes tool calls that align with the user objective and past successful executions. Experiments on AgentDojo and AgentDyn show that SARA reduces action‑to‑side‑effect risk to below 0.63% while preserving task performance.
By Xiaokun Guo, Zhen Xu, Dongdong Huo, Yanqiu Zhang, Wei Wang, Qinfu Yang, Dongjin Yu, Yu Wang
arXiv:2509. 25624v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As LLMs advance into autonomous agents with tool-use capabilities, they introduce security challenges that extend beyond traditional content-based LLM safety concerns.
By Jing-Jing Li, Jianfeng He, Chao Shang, Devang Kulshreshtha, Xun Xian, Yi Zhang, Hang Su, Sandesh Swamy, Yanjun Qi
SecureGARD is a dynamic ontology‑guided governance framework designed to secure tool‑using large language model agents. It grounds heterogeneous tool calls in a shared semantic representation, using an executable ontology combined with episode‑level task state to make deterministic ready, waiting, and forbidden decisions. The system evolves its ontology offline from verified training executions, ensuring logical consistency and protecting entailments, and achieves a 0% attack success rate across multiple benchmarks while improving task utility under attack.
By Guoqin Xiong, Shengtao Wen, Xiang Chen, Xinyi Zeng, Zhaoxin Fan, Wei Ye, Xiaofeng Cao, Sheng-Jun Huang