The paper presents an uncoupled learning algorithm, higher-order optimism with discounting (HOOD), for arbitrary N-player normal form games with up to K actions per player. HOOD achieves an individual regret bound of O(N³ log² K) uniformly over the play horizon by combining a discounted (N+1)-th order predictor with entropic regularization over a lifted strategy space. This design mitigates large oscillations in play, addressing a key challenge in prior attempts to attain constant regret in general games.
By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2609. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$.
By Tung Mai
arXiv:2609.21976v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We introduce Multiplicatively Optimistic Regret Matching (MORM), an uncoupled learning rule for finite general-sum games. Under simultaneous full-inf...
By Ashkan Soleymani, Georgios Piliouras
arXiv:2608. 31166v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon.
By Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar
arXiv:2607. 19854v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study horizon-free regret minimization for finite-horizon time-homogeneous tabular Markov decision processes with $S$ states, $A$ actions, horizon $H$, and per-trajectory total reward bounded by $1$.
By Runlong Zhou, Zihan Zhang, Maryam Fazel, Simon S. Du
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon...
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
By Taira Tsuchiya
arXiv:2609.16751v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve c...
By Tung Mai
arXiv:2610.00911v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study an endogenous nonstationary stochastic bandit problem with latent linear dynamics, where actions affect both immediate rewards and the future...
By Taehyun Hwang, Hyunjun Choi, Heesang Ann, Min-hwan Oh
arXiv:2608.24731v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We settle the minimax-optimal alternating regret, a regret notion motivated by alternating learning dynamics in games, for both online linear optimizat...
By Yixin Tao, Weiqiang Zheng
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
By Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu, Kaiqing Zhang
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos