The paper "Beyond Training: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Inference-Time AI Governance" presents a taxonomy of twenty inference‑time mechanisms for monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each evaluated on a four‑point readiness scale using evidence from four vendors. It applies this taxonomy to a two‑dimensional adversary model and maps the mechanisms to four governance scenarios, finding that most mechanisms are commercially available but only adequate against cooperative or low‑to‑medium‑capability users, not high‑capability state‑level deployers. The study also links inference‑stage controls to hardware‑stage mechanisms through a substitution principle and reports a second‑rater reliability of 0.74.
whyItMatters":"The work identifies the current gaps and readiness of inference‑time governance tools, highlighting that existing mechanisms are insufficient against powerful adversaries and thus informing future regulatory and technical development."
By Samar Ansari
arXiv:2608. 11344v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Financial institutions are delegating consequential decisions to agentic AI systems that decompose goals, coordinate models and tools, and act with little oversight.
By Henry Han
arXiv:2606. 12320v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise security was built to govern data boundaries: the protected surface was data at rest and in transit, and the controls -- access control, data-loss prevention, perimeter inspection -- governed crossings of that boundary.
By Krti Tallam
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
By Serhii Zabolotnii
The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.
By Rudrendu Kumar Paul, Sourav Nandy
arXiv:2609.37457v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Enterprise artificial-intelligence agents increasingly call tools, modify infrastructure, and process protected data, creating a need to separate actio...
By Kabeh Mohsenzadegan, Vahid Tavakkoli, Kyandoghere Kyamakya
arXiv:2606. 05433v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier AI governance frameworks increasingly use cumulative training compute as the primary criterion for designating high-impact models, but enforcement rests on self-reporting because no technical verification primitive for training exists.
By Pierre Peign\'e, Ky Nguyen, Paul Wang
arXiv:2606. 00047v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier AI governance often centres on the model-level governance paradigm, which assumes that a model's capability profile is primarily a function of the compute and data used during training.
By Arthur Goemans, Dan Altman, Noemi Dreksler, Jonas Freund, Milan Gandhi, Zhengdong Wang, Sarah Cogan, Sebastien Krier, Demetra Brady, Lewis Ho, Allan Dafoe
The paper discusses how financial institutions are increasingly using AI agents in areas such as credit, fraud, and compliance, yet current governance focuses only on individual components. It introduces ARIA, a finance‑specific reference architecture that adds six capabilities—policy specification, population‑level monitoring, bounded authority, runtime containment, adaptive policy change, and preserved human oversight—to address the gap of constitutional non‑compositionality. Two simulations demonstrate how local controls can miss collective bias and how observed‑versus‑expected monitoring can provide earlier warnings of drift.
By Jose Manuel de la Chica Rodriguez, Juan Manuel Vera Diaz, Pablo Delgado Romero
arXiv:2606. 04037v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Pre-deployment verification of enterprise artificial intelligence (AI) agents remains a critical gap between large language model (LLM) capability benchmarking and production deployment.
By Thanh Luong Tuan, Abhijit Sanyal
The paper "Governing at Machine Speed: An Adaptive Intelligence Architecture for Real-Time AI Policy Enforcement" highlights a gap in enterprise AI governance, where 78% of organizations lack auditable evidence of policy enforcement. It introduces AGIL, a five-layer adaptive governance architecture that uses machine learning for real-time detection, risk classification, sub-100ms policy enforcement, continuous attestation, and policy evolution. The authors argue that the failure is organizational and architectural, not technical, and call for future empirical validation of AGIL.
By Sandeep Bokkasam, B. Durgalakshmi
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)