arXiv:2510. 02660v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: When researchers claim AI systems possess ToM or mental models, they are fundamentally discussing behavioral predictions and bias corrections rather than genuine mental states.
By Xiaoyun Yin, Elmira Zahmat Doost, Shiwen Zhou, Garima Arya Yadav, Jamie C. Gorman
The article discusses how artificial intelligence is beginning to automate scientific discovery, specifically in the realm of cognitive science. It outlines four key challenges for developing an automated science of the mind: representing experiments, generating synthetic behavior, synthesizing models, and closing the loop to discover psychological theories. The authors argue that addressing these challenges will enable AI to systematically advance our understanding of the mind.
By Akshay K. Jagadish, Milena Rmus, Kristin Witte, Marvin Mathony, Marcel Binz, Eric Schulz
arXiv:2606. 12721v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Inferring others' beliefs requires more than reading surface signals; it requires tracking who told them what, in what order, and how credibly.
By Nikolos Gurney, Stacy Marsella
arXiv:2608. 13567v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The human brain exhibits a striking degree of functional specialization, with distinct networks supporting language, formal reasoning, reasoning about other minds, and reasoning about the physical world.
By Pengrui Han, Jacob Andreas, Evelina Fedorenko, Andrea Gregor de Varda
arXiv:2606.12721v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Inferring another person's beliefs requires reconstructing their information access history: what they encountered, in what order, from whom, and w...
By Nikolos Gurney, Stacy Marsella
arXiv:2604.27927v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: We introduce a framework called LAPITHS (Language model Analysis through Paradigm grounded Interpretations of Theses about Human likenesS) and use...
By Matteo Da Pelo, Alessio Donvito, Claudio Frongia, Pietro Salis, Antonio Lieto
arXiv:2603.18007v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: The study explores whether current Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities -- specifically, the ability to inf...
By Anna Babarczy, Andras Lukacs, Peter Vedres, Zeteny Bujka
arXiv:2607. 11881v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Metacognition is a foundational component of intelligence critical to effective learning, problem solving, decision-making, communication, and more.
By Gabrielle Kaili-May Liu, Areeb Gani, Jacqueline Lu, Jordan Thomas, Mark Steyvers, Arman Cohan
arXiv:2606. 30481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current large language models are extraordinary statistical engines.
By Ziqin Yuan, Jaymari Chua
arXiv:2509. 14474v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The debate around Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) remains open due to two fundamentally different goals: replicating human-level performance versus replicating human-like cognitive processes.
By Meltem Subasioglu, Nevzat Subasioglu
arXiv:2606. 16944v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to ascribe mental states to others and use those ascriptions for prediction and inference, is widely assumed to be essential for effective human-machine integration.
By Nikolos Gurney
CoMMET is a new multimodal benchmark designed to evaluate Theory of Mind (ToM) in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). It expands beyond existing text-only, belief-focused tests by covering a wider range of mental states, incorporating moral evaluation, and enabling multi-turn, open-ended interactions. The dataset is grounded in psychological theory and provides a comprehensive assessment across different model families and sizes, revealing strengths, limitations, and future improvement directions.
By Ruirui Chen, Weifeng Jiang, Chengwei Qin, Kaiwen Wei, Yanzhen Yue, Cheston Tan