arXiv AI

Mechanism Design for Alignment and Control

arXiv AI
Jun 9

Payoff scaling shapes cooperation in LLM agents across languages

arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.

By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Thanh-Bang Cao, Phong-Hao Le, Hong-Dan Nguyen, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Minh-Luan Nguyen-Vo, Hong-Phat Pham, Phu-Hoa Pham, Thien-Kim Than, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Huy Tran, Gia-Thoai Tran-Le, Alessio Buscemi, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv AI
Jun 3

Economy of Minds: Emerging Multi-Agent Intelligence with Economic Interactions

arXiv:2606. 02859v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control?

By Zhenting Qi, Huangyuan Su, Ao Qu, Chenyu Wang, Yu Yao, Han Zheng, Kushal Chattopadhyay, Guowei Xu, Zihan Wang, Weirui Ye, Vijay Janapa Reddi, Ju Li, Paul Pu Liang, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Sham Kakade, Yilun Du
arXiv AI
Aug 28

Five Primitives for Governing Autonomous AI Agents at Runtime

The paper proposes five runtime primitives—discovery, identity, governance, attestation, and supply chain—to manage autonomous AI agents in enterprise settings. It argues that traditional control models fail because agents are transient, model-driven, and self‑discoverable, making runtime governance essential. The authors detail an implementation that mediates agent actions against policy, authorizes them via a per‑tenant vocabulary, and records them in a verifiable ledger, noting the associated operational costs and partial deployment status.

By Jiten Oswal, John Cadeddu
arXiv AI
Jul 7

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.

By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin