The paper studies how to safely delegate action approval to multiple AI reviewers when the reviewers themselves may be misaligned. It introduces a weaker condition—k‑robust coalitional alignment—under which a threshold rule that tolerates up to k disapprovals guarantees that the principal’s expected utility is at least as good as a baseline policy. The authors extend this characterization to sequential decision‑making in discounted MDPs and show that full‑panel coverage of reward functions ensures safety in Nash equilibria, while more permissive thresholds can lead to unsafe outcomes. Experiments demonstrate that collective review can remain sound even when individual reviewers are not fully aligned, provided some disapprovals are allowed.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.
arXiv:2606. 28710v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm.
arXiv:2608.22444v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The unit of AI safety evaluation is still the individual model, yet language-model agents are increasingly deployed in interacting populations that rea...
The paper examines how an agent’s probability report is evaluated twice—once by a strictly proper scoring rule and again by an approval rule that determines a decision. It shows that when the approval rule is welfare‑maximizing, it cannot be affine, yet the resulting distortion is predictable and can be mitigated by a reserve report that neutralizes the cost of pretending to be the marginal type. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink achieves first‑best welfare, while smooth rules cannot, and the key constraint is the steepness of the rule rather than its smoothness.
arXiv:2608. 06422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Giving an LLM judge more compute does not necessarily make it check more requirements.
arXiv:2606. 30383v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A rapidly growing class of LLM agents is multi-party: the agent acts for a principal (who briefs it, sends follow-ups, and receives results) while also conversing in a separate channel with a counterparty whose interests may diverge (negotiating with a vendor, screening inbound requests, or mediating between employees).
arXiv:2605. 25739v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We prove that no reinforcement learning policy with confidence-gated autonomy can simultaneously achieve maximum helpfulness, optimal calibration, and full autonomy under rational oversight, whenever some tasks exceed the agent's reliable competence: the Behavioral Credibility Trilemma.
The paper introduces Collective Counterfactual Planning (CCP), a formal model describing how teams coordinate tasks that no single member can handle alone, constrained not by capability but by representational geometry. CCP defines four critical gates—exogenous implementation coalitions, conception, consent, and task-relative verification—that determine whether a team can achieve and legitimately recognize a conjunctive goal. The authors present the Collective Counterfactual Solvability (CCS) problem, separating geometric feasibility, executable attainment, and validated completion, and provide a sound and complete four-step solvability scheme under exact representation of relay closure.
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
The paper demonstrates that safety mechanisms for autonomous large language model agents fail to compose across iterative loops, as trajectory‑scoped monitors cannot detect attacks whose evidence is spread over multiple iterations. It introduces LoopHarness, a system that maintains a persistent, non‑decaying safety state across loops, bounding unauthorized actions with a constant that does not grow with the number of iterations. The authors provide a comprehensive evaluation protocol, including attacks that require cross‑iteration evidence, module ablations, and adaptive white‑box red‑team testing.
The paper introduces PRIMUS, an extension of the PRIMA framework that combines prime‑power agent identity with BLS aggregate signatures to improve governance in multi‑agent federations. PRIMUS achieves a safe‑kill threshold that eliminates false‑positive agent termination under noisy conditions, identifies an economic boundary where singleton governance outperforms Byzantine quorum, and implements VRF succession with lease and fencing for unconditional safety under partial synchrony. The study also explores converting PRIMA’s binary artifact‑fidelity verdict into a graded fitness signal, demonstrating strong calibration against injected faults but reduced effectiveness on real LLM‑generated candidates, and reports a program cost of USD 164.78.