arXiv AI By Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Charlie Tharas, Samuele Marro, Van Q. Truong, Bernhard Sch\"olkopf, Emanuele La Malfa, Zhijing Jin

Mechanism Design Is Not Enough: Prosocial Agents for Cooperative AI

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arXiv:2605. 08426v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Ensuring that AI agents behave safely and beneficially when interacting with other parties has emerged as one of the central challenges of modern AI safety.

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arXiv AI
Jul 7

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.

By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv AI
Sep 16

Agentic Societies Need a Social Harness

arXiv:2609.17527v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agentic society is a collection of AI agents that coordinate autonomously across trust boundaries, on behalf of different principals whose objecti...

By Tapan Chugh, Vidushi Singh, Krish Jain, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Ratul Mahajan