arXiv:2506. 03933v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in multimodal understanding, yet their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations poses a significant threat to their reliability in real-world applications.
By Jia Fu, Yongtao Wu, Yihang Chen, Kunyu Peng, Xiao Zhang, Volkan Cevher, Sepideh Pashami, Anders Holst
The paper introduces TempJail, a temporal jailbreak framework targeting image‑to‑video generation models. It exploits a newly identified vulnerability where unsafe semantics arise from the composition of frames over time, rather than from single‑frame violations. By decomposing malicious captions into visual conditions and temporal instructions, and by employing controlled latent perturbations and template rewriting, TempJail achieves a 23.3 % higher attack success rate than prior methods on several commercial models.
By Qi Lu, Zehui Guo, David Yuanda Gan, Zijing Li, Hengda Zhang, Weijun Xu, Qiankun Zhang
arXiv:2502. 16167v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Diffusion models (DMs) have advanced text-to-image (T2I) synthesis, yet their personalization capabilities raise serious privacy and copyright concerns.
By Xinwei Liu, Xiaojun Jia, Yuan Xun, Hua Zhang, Xiaochun Cao
arXiv:2605. 25194v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Adversarial images pose a severe security threat to multimodal large language models through prompt injection.
By Dongpeng Zhang, Ke Ma, Yangbangyan Jiang, Gaozheng Pei, Longtao Huang, Qianqian Xu, Qingming Huang
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
By Ilan Zini, Boussad Addad, Katarzyna Kapusta
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.
arXiv:2606. 11615v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The widespread adoption of face recognition (FR) technologies raises serious privacy concerns, as facial data can be exploited without consent.
By Omid Ahmadieh, Nima Karimian
arXiv:2607. 07922v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision Transformers (ViTs) remain vulnerable to localized adversarial attacks, e.
By Giulia Marchiori Pietrosanti, Giulio Rossolini, Giorgio Buttazzo
Recent advancements in Image-to-Video (I2V) generation have transformed input images from simple appearance references into interactive control interfaces where visual cues such as arrows, sketches, and emojis orchestrate complex video dynamics with unprecedented controllability. However, these seemingly innocuous static cues can be interpreted by models as executable temporal instructions, unfolding into harmful actions in the generated videos.
arXiv:2607. 12354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we challenge the prevailing view that information dependency (including rote memorization) drives training data exposure to image reconstruction attacks.
By Rasmus Torp, Shailen K. Smith, Adam Breuer
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
arXiv:2606. 17257v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Open-weight video diffusion models can generate photorealistic unsafe content, from violence to misinformation, yet existing defenses either require expensive safety fine-tuning that degrades general capability, or apply external filters that are trivially bypassed by adversarial prompts.
By Rohit Kundu, Arindam Dutta, Sarosij Bose, Athula Balachandran, Amit K. Roy-Chowdhury