arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2607. 17201v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In this work we study the Best Policy Identification (BPI) problem in online, tabular Reinforcement Learning.
By Joseph Lazzaro, Alessio Russo, Aldo Pacchiano
arXiv:2605. 12646v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is widely agreed that when AI models assist decision-makers in high-stakes domains by predicting an outcome of interest, they should communicate the confidence of their predictions.
By Nina Corvelo Benz, Eleni Straitouri, Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez
arXiv:2606. 06043v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Follow-the-regularized-leader framework has shown effectiveness and flexibility in online learning problems, where the choice of learning rates are known to be crucial.
By Jongyeong Lee, Junya Honda, Shinji Ito, Chansoo Kim
arXiv:2602. 06257v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Online strategic classification studies settings in which agents strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictions.
By Chase Hutton, Adam Melrod, Han Shao
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
The paper introduces online contextual matrix games, a framework that merges contextual bandits with multi‑player online games to handle dynamic contexts and strategic interactions. It presents OnGameLearn, an algorithm that balances exploration and exploitation across actions and contexts, providing statistical guarantees such as tail bounds, Nash equilibrium convergence, asymptotic normality, and sublinear regret. The authors also define a policy value for matrix games and propose a doubly robust, √T‑consistent estimator, demonstrating effectiveness through simulations and a hotel pricing case study.
By Liner Xiang, Yixin Wang, Hengrui Cai
arXiv:2608. 08268v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics.
By Dantong Chu, Xuefeng Gao, Yufei Zhang
arXiv:2605. 09200v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study adversarial noisy bandits given a known function class $\mathcal{F}$.
By Steve Hanneke, Kun Wang
The paper investigates preference-based bandits where a learner selects pairs of arms and receives binary preference feedback modeled by Bradley–Terry. It introduces the locally sensitive eluder dimension, a new complexity measure for logistic preference feedback, and proposes the GINOP algorithm that uses log-loss confidence sets to balance optimism and exploration. The authors prove a first-order regret bound showing that learning with preference feedback can be as statistically efficient as learning from direct rewards, and they validate their theory with empirical experiments.
By Ahmed Ben Yahmed (CREST, ENSAE Paris, FAIRPLAY), Marc Abeille (FAIRPLAY), Cl\'ement Calauz\`enes (FAIRPLAY)
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2601. 09825v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We establish a lower bound on the eluder dimension of generalised linear model classes, showing that standard eluder dimension-based analysis cannot lead to first-order regret bounds.
By Alireza Bakhtiari, Alex Ayoub, Samuel Robertson, David Janz, Csaba Szepesv\'ari