arXiv AI

Learning to Decide with AI Assistance under Human-Alignment

arXiv:2605. 12646v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is widely agreed that when AI models assist decision-makers in high-stakes domains by predicting an outcome of interest, they should communicate the confidence of their predictions.

arXiv AI
3d ago

On the Complexity of Preference-Based Bandits

The paper investigates preference-based bandits where a learner selects pairs of arms and receives binary preference feedback modeled by Bradley–Terry. It introduces the locally sensitive eluder dimension, a new complexity measure for logistic preference feedback, and proposes the GINOP algorithm that uses log-loss confidence sets to balance optimism and exploration. The authors prove a first-order regret bound showing that learning with preference feedback can be as statistically efficient as learning from direct rewards, and they validate their theory with empirical experiments.

By Ahmed Ben Yahmed (CREST, ENSAE Paris, FAIRPLAY), Marc Abeille (FAIRPLAY), Cl\'ement Calauz\`enes (FAIRPLAY)
arXiv AI
Jul 10

Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games

arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.

By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 4

Tail-Aware Information-Theoretic Bounds for LLM Alignment under Heavy-Tailed Rewards

arXiv:2604. 10727v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Classical information-theoretic learning bounds typically rely on KL mutual information and moment-generating-function (MGF) arguments, which are well matched to bounded or sub-Gaussian losses but can be ineffective when losses or rewards are heavy-tailed.

By Huiming Zhang, Binghan Li, Wan Tian, Qiang Sun
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 10

Multiscale Reward Hedging from Correct Demonstrations

arXiv:2608. 06825v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Learning from correct demonstrations is harder than supervised learning when many answers are correct: after predicting, the learner sees one valid answer but not whether its own answer was valid, nor any reward.

By Pahan Dewasurendra
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 22

Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games

arXiv:2504.09006v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual...

By Maria-Florina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia, Keegan Harris