arXiv AI By Riccardo Formenti, Aditya Agrawal, Vikas Garg

Can You Trust Your Preference Models? Stackelberg Games for Alignment

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arXiv AI
Oct 1

Multi-LLM Collaborative Alignment via Stackelberg Games

The paper introduces Stackelberg Alignment, a leader‑follower framework that lets a pool of language models collaborate and improve by learning from each other’s responses. An EXP3 bandit leader adaptively selects instructions based on difficulty and discriminability, while the models act as followers, evaluating peers and learning via DPO or GRPO with Elo‑style reputation weighting and opponent matching. Experiments on diverse benchmarks show that this adaptive curriculum outperforms static baselines by up to 12‑25% and improves multi‑LLM evolution.

By Christina Hahn, Shangbin Feng, Dean Light, Swastik Roy, Hila Gonen, Yulia Tsvetkov
arXiv AI
Oct 2

Robust Nash Alignment under Preference Uncertainty

Robust Nash Alignment introduces a game-theoretic framework that seeks a policy with a high worst-case win rate against both an adversarial competitor and any preference kernel within an ambiguity set around a nominal preference. The authors propose a four-player primal-dual proxy game and an optimistic mirror descent-ascent algorithm to efficiently optimize this robust objective, proving convergence guarantees and demonstrating improved performance in controlled tabular games and LLM alignment experiments.

By Shihab Ahmed, Debamita Ghosh, David Tang, Yudan Wang, Alvaro Velasquez, Yue Wang