arXiv Machine Learning

Shared SFT Lessons Across Alignment, Model Organisms, and Toy Models

arXiv:2607. 26173v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Alignment training, model organisms, and toy models are usually treated as separate research areas.

arXiv AI
3d ago

Alignment via Training Against Probes Without Losing Monitorability

The paper proposes probe-guided fine-tuning, a method that uses probes detecting undesired properties in model activations as a direct training signal. Experiments show that continuously updated probes reduce harmfulness and improve honesty while preserving utility, outperforming DPO and inference-time steering in safety-utility trade-offs and robustness to jailbreak and abliteration attacks. Importantly, the concepts remain linearly encoded after fine-tuning, maintaining monitorability.

By Lena Libon, Alexander Panfilov, Ben Rank, Xin Chen, Jonas Geiping, Maksym Andriushchenko
arXiv AI
Sep 18

Stress-testing Alignment Midtraining

The paper "Stress-testing Alignment Midtraining" examines the effectiveness of alignment midtraining (AMT), a technique that continues pretraining on alignment-relevant data to improve generalisation beyond post‑training methods. Experiments on models up to 110 billion parameters and 1 billion midtraining tokens reveal that AMT can steer a model’s motivation in simple scenarios, but its effects are quickly overridden by even a tiny fraction of finetuning data with a competing motivation. The study also shows that rule-following requires demonstrations in either the midtraining or post‑training datasets to be robustly learned, leading the authors to conclude that current public evidence is insufficient to confirm that AMT resolves the core alignment challenges of powerful AI systems.

By Sid Baines, Jonathan Bostock, Maria Angelica Martinez, Andrew Draganov, David Africa, Daniel Tan
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 5

Alignment Risks from Capability-Seeking RL Training

arXiv:2602. 12124v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: While most AI alignment research focuses on preventing models from generating explicitly harmful content, a more subtle risk arises from capability-seeking RL training in vulnerable environments.

By Yujun Zhou, Yue Huang, Han Bao, Kehan Guo, Zhenwen Liang, Pin-Yu Chen, Tian Gao, Werner Geyer, Nuno Moniz, Nitesh V Chawla, Xiangliang Zhang