Early Data Exposure Improves Robustness to Subsequent Fine-Tuning
arXiv:2605. 12705v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: How can we train models whose post-trained capabilities survive subsequent fine-tuning?
arXiv:2607. 25063v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Developers judge a model checkpoint by how it behaves.
arXiv:2605. 12705v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: How can we train models whose post-trained capabilities survive subsequent fine-tuning?
arXiv:2607. 26173v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Alignment training, model organisms, and toy models are usually treated as separate research areas.
arXiv:2607. 18639v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety interventions on dual-use knowledge typically choose between destroying hazardous content (e.
arXiv:2607. 26654v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Post-training alignment is often shallow, eroding under fine-tuning.
arXiv:2607. 18966v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective.
arXiv:2607. 01480v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), along with recent selfdistillation variants such as SDPO, evaluates each rollout against a verifier and updates the policy from that episode-level signal.
Safety interventions on dual-use knowledge typically choose between destroying hazardous content (e. g.
Alignment training, model organisms, and toy models are usually treated as separate research areas. But projects in all three frequently use supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to pursue the same underlying goals.
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
arXiv:2605. 07284v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A late-layer change learned during post-training may work on the base model's earlier state, or it may depend on earlier computation learned with it.
Safety alignment in large language models can be fragile under fine-tuning, as even benign task adaptation may increase harmful compliance. Existing defenses mainly follow two directions: they either intervene during or after fine-tuning through retraining or weight modification, which can be costly and may hurt task performance, or they use model-agnostic safety classifiers, which may miss failures specific to a given fine-tuned checkpoint.
arXiv:2607. 14552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors.