The paper investigates whether interactive arguments for oracle‑aided AI computations can be zero‑knowledge, meaning the verifier learns nothing beyond the correctness of the output. It proves that, in general, zero‑knowledge proofs for all oracle‑aided computations are impossible, even in the random oracle model, and this impossibility extends to debate protocols. However, if the oracle signs each answer with a cryptographic signature, then every oracle‑aided computation can be verified in zero‑knowledge with efficient provers and verifiers, assuming only collision‑resistant hash functions.
arXiv:2607. 03561v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI models continue to develop powerful capabilities, it becomes critical that we are able to verify that their output is aligned with our intentions.
arXiv:2608. 11181v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a probabilistic predictor answers many conditional-probability queries, are its answers self-consistent, and can this be verified in polynomial time?
The paper presents an interactive probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) protocol that allows a polynomial‑time verifier to check the approximate consistency of a probabilistic predictor defined by two circuits, P and Q. By evaluating these circuits at a few points and querying a proof oracle that encodes a witnessing probability distribution, the verifier can confirm that the predictor’s many conditional‑probability claims are self‑consistent. The authors also establish that the problem of verifying l₂‑approximate consistency for explicit probabilistic claims lies in NP, with certificates of size O(mn + log B), and show how to eliminate dependence on the input bit‑precision B through a small additive gap.
arXiv:2607. 06341v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Formal verification offers the strongest guarantee of software correctness, but it does not scale: the proofs demanded by interactive theorem provers such as Coq require enormous expert effort.
arXiv:2608.28639v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Formal theorem proving with large language models remains challenging due to the difficulty of navigating large proof search spaces efficiently. Existi...
arXiv:2602. 20064v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results.
arXiv:2608.28997v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In May 2026 an OpenAI model produced a counterexample to the Erd\H{o}s unit distance conjecture. Five mathematicians published a human-verified version...
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2607. 21325v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
Formal verification offers the strongest guarantee of software correctness, but it does not scale: the proofs demanded by interactive theorem provers such as Coq require enormous expert effort. Large language models (LLMs) promise to generate these proofs automatically, yet existing approaches wire a fixed, human-designed proof strategy into the system and constrain the model to follow it (retrieving premises and predicting tactics one step at a time, or splitting goals by divide-and-conquer), and still prove only a fraction of their target theorems.
arXiv:2607. 01223v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When should an AI system's answer be trusted?
arXiv:2607. 21325v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.