arXiv:2607. 21325v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
By M. Llamb\'i-Morillas, D. Fern\'andez-Fern\'andez
arXiv:2606. 03518v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur.
By Amjad Ibrahim, Yong Li
arXiv:2606. 23768v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose cryptographic certificates of validity for agentic AI systems.
By Murdoch J. Gabbay
arXiv:2606. 30970v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly perform consequential actions on behalf of human principals, including financial transactions, external communications, and enterprise workflows.
By Anuj Kaul, Qianlong Lan, Pranay Gupta
arXiv:2606. 30970v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly perform consequential actions on behalf of human principals, including financial transactions, external communications, and enterprise workflows.
By Anuj Kaul, Qianlong Lan, Pranay Gupta
arXiv:2606. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic infrastructure introduces a critical control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems can propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, yet existing security mechanisms -- such as identity and access management (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs -- either enforce static, context-unaware permissions or merely record actions post-execution.
By Jun He, Deying Yu
arXiv:2608. 14074v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act on external systems through standardized tool-calling protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), yet no infrastructure layer constrains their actions to what a principal has verifiably authorized: authorization logic lives in application code, is neither signed nor independently auditable, and the resulting logs lack evidentiary value.
By Giovanni Racioppi
arXiv:2606. 04193v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI agent observability is structurally compromised: the entity producing the activity log is the same entity whose activity is being logged.
By Juan Figuera
arXiv:2606. 19464v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agentic AI systems driven by Large Language Models (LLMs) introduce a new class of security, privacy, and compliance challenges: an agent that can invoke tools, manipulate data, install software, and coordinate with peer agents across organizational boundaries must be constrained not just by authentication and access control, but by the full structure of enterprise governance.
By Anupam Joshi, Tim Finin, Karuna Pande Joshi, Lalana Kagal
arXiv:2607. 05397v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems increasingly execute rather than advise.
By James Rhodes, George Kang
arXiv:2606. 00962v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Foundational agent interoperability standards, notably the Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol and the Model Context Protocol (MCP), have advanced multi-agent system communication, and complementary identity frameworks leveraging W3C Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs) provide cryptographic agent authentication.
By Hassan Touheed
arXiv:2607. 13718v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail.
By Alexandra E. Michael, Franziska Roesner