The paper investigates whether interactive arguments for oracle‑aided AI computations can be zero‑knowledge, meaning the verifier learns nothing beyond the correctness of the output. It proves that, in general, zero‑knowledge proofs for all oracle‑aided computations are impossible, even in the random oracle model, and this impossibility extends to debate protocols. However, if the oracle signs each answer with a cryptographic signature, then every oracle‑aided computation can be verified in zero‑knowledge with efficient provers and verifiers, assuming only collision‑resistant hash functions.
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