arXiv:2602. 20064v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results.
arXiv:2606. 27567v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection is the top security risk for LLM-integrated applications, yet every defense proposed so far has been broken.
arXiv:2606. 09549v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2607. 24625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents processing mixed-confidentiality data face severe security risks from prompt injection attacks and reasoning errors.
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.
arXiv:2608. 07167v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Giving an AI agent the ability to send emails, query databases, or execute commands is useful--until the agent is tricked into doing something it shouldn't.
arXiv:2607. 14137v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: To answer a question about a program, move the program to where the question is decidable.
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
arXiv:2606. 08539v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly take consequential actions -- shell commands, cloud operations, and arbitrary tool-calls -- so a trust layer must decide, per action, whether to allow, warn, block, or escalate.
Formal verification offers the strongest guarantee of software correctness, but it does not scale: the proofs demanded by interactive theorem provers such as Coq require enormous expert effort. Large language models (LLMs) promise to generate these proofs automatically, yet existing approaches wire a fixed, human-designed proof strategy into the system and constrain the model to follow it (retrieving premises and predicting tactics one step at a time, or splitting goals by divide-and-conquer), and still prove only a fraction of their target theorems.
arXiv:2607. 06341v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Formal verification offers the strongest guarantee of software correctness, but it does not scale: the proofs demanded by interactive theorem provers such as Coq require enormous expert effort.
arXiv:2601. 09923v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior.