arXiv:2606. 15348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet.
By Ryota Kanai, Shuqin Ma
The paper studies when joint-embedding predictive architectures (JEPAs) can recover underlying causal states from high‑dimensional observations. It introduces a latent variable model where observations arise from causal states with action‑conditioned dynamics, and proposes an information‑theoretic objective that maximizes conditional likelihood while preserving state entropy. The authors prove identifiability conditions—particularly sufficient action‑induced variation—and instantiate the objective as an action‑modulated Gaussian additive‑noise model (A‑JEPA), demonstrating theoretical and empirical success in synthetic and visual benchmarks.
By Yuhang Liu, Zhuo Huang, Javen Qinfeng Shi
arXiv:2607. 11958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Under the free energy principle, a predictive system does not observe reality directly; it maintains a generative model of the world and experiences that model's best current hypothesis.
By MD Ibrahim Hossain Ridoy
The paper argues that the current debate on machine consciousness rests on the mistaken assumption that AI systems are already the kind of entities that could possess consciousness. By distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, it introduces the AI Consciousness Fallacy, showing that generative models can produce first‑person linguistic traces without being conscious. It then proposes Causal Liability Theory (CLT), with CLT‑I defining liability closure as a criterion for identifying a bearer of consciousness and CLT‑II suggesting that liability closure is both necessary and sufficient for minimal phenomenal subjecthood, and demonstrates experimentally that these distinctions are tractable and can separate causal bearer structure from first‑person performance.
By Afshin Khadangi
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
By Shamil Chandaria, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Fernando Rosas, Anil Seth, Henry Shevlin, Marcus Hutter, Thore Graepel, Adam Bales, Iulia Comsa, Murray Shanahan, Ruben Laukkonen, Morten Kringelbach, Chris Frith, Shane Legg
arXiv:2606. 10934v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices.
By Fabio Rovai