arXiv:2606. 15348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet.
By Ryota Kanai, Shuqin Ma
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
By Shamil Chandaria, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Fernando Rosas, Anil Seth, Henry Shevlin, Marcus Hutter, Thore Graepel, Adam Bales, Iulia Comsa, Murray Shanahan, Ruben Laukkonen, Morten Kringelbach, Chris Frith, Shane Legg
arXiv:2507. 05888v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vernon Mountcastle hypothesized that the basis for intelligence in mammals is the replication of a general computational unit, the cortical column.
By Jeff Hawkins (Thousand Brains Project), Niels Leadholm (Thousand Brains Project), Viviane Clay (Thousand Brains Project)
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
By Sebastian Cochinescu
The article introduces a mathematical model of the Motivated Emotional Mind cognitive architecture for embodied intelligent systems. It formalizes a re‑entrant loop that integrates feedforward processing, lateral interactions, and feedback pathways, along with representational selection mechanisms that govern adaptive responses. The model binds exteroceptive and interoceptive signals, bodily-motivational context, and memory traces into associative structures called semblions, enabling motivated learning that incorporates need thresholds, goal generation, and regulatory constraints.
By Wies{\l}aw L. Galus, Janusz A. Starzyk
arXiv:2607. 19973v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI researchers describe state-of-the-art models as one thing repeated at scale: the Transformer, wired identically for text, pixels, or speech.
By Jaeho Seol
Can scientific abduction occur without continuous sensorimotor embodiment? Recent arguments in AI and philosophy of science hold that genuine hypothesis generation requires an agent continuously coupled to the physical world.
The paper proposes a five‑layer implementation architecture for the S3Q theory of consciousness, mapping its three core conditions—grounded sensorimotor situatedness, internal simulation via a world model, and structural coherence between predictions and observations—to existing computational primitives. It integrates these components into a single pipeline that processes continuous, differentiable per‑object slot vectors, includes a developmental bootstrap sequence, and yields falsifiable predictions that cannot be produced by any subset of the architecture alone. The model further suggests that a basic sense of self emerges from linking actions to outcomes, and that behavior can be categorized into hesitation, curiosity, or avoidance based on outcome unexpectedness and valence.
"whyItMatters":"The architecture provides a concrete, testable framework that unifies theoretical conditions of consciousness with practical computational components, enabling empirical investigation of machine consciousness."
By Tetiana Grinberg, Katrina Schleisman, Patryk Laurent, Bogdan Udrea, Minda Myers, Brian Aufderheide, Luis El Srouji, Doyle Groves, Kevin Schmidt
arXiv:2607. 11958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Under the free energy principle, a predictive system does not observe reality directly; it maintains a generative model of the world and experiences that model's best current hypothesis.
By MD Ibrahim Hossain Ridoy
arXiv:2608.22347v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: A cognitive architecture is more than the module that reasons: it must also decide how long to think and what deserves the effort. We built a minimal b...
By Francisco M. Arrabal-Campos, Francisco G. Montoya, Alfredo Alcayde, Ignacio Fern\'andez
arXiv:2509. 14474v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The debate around Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) remains open due to two fundamentally different goals: replicating human-level performance versus replicating human-like cognitive processes.
By Meltem Subasioglu, Nevzat Subasioglu
arXiv:2608. 01548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language can be viewed as a formalized subset of thought: a consequence-governed symbolic structure projected from wider situated cognition.
By Yi Liu