arXiv:2610.01385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This work aims to answer the question of whether it is possible to generate irreversible protected templates when the PolyProtect biometric template...
This work aims to answer the question of whether it is possible to generate irreversible protected templates when the PolyProtect biometric template protection method is applied to face embeddings usi...
arXiv:2602.02914v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Privacy-preserving face recognition (PPFR) and face anonymization have different goals, but both must retain some identity-related information for...
arXiv:2607. 17504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers.
Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers. Existing privacy-preserving face recognition methods mainly aim to resist unauthorized reconstruction, typically producing features whose inversion yields visibly degraded results, which may reveal the existence of protection and motivate adaptive attacks.
arXiv:2510. 25687v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model inversion attacks pose an open challenge to privacy-sensitive applications that use machine learning (ML) models.
arXiv:2607. 29144v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition.
arXiv:2608.29802v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Face recognition systems are increasingly deployed in security-critical applications, yet they remain vulnerable to presentation and morph attacks. Pre...
The paper compares four audit methods for assessing identity‑level differential privacy in pre‑trained, black‑box face generators. Each method—GaussMech, KDE‑LR, MMD‑TV, and ROC‑HT—has distinct assumptions, hyperparameters, and finite‑sample limitations, and they produce markedly different epsilon estimates when applied to FaceFusion and InstantID. The study finds that all methods reveal significant identity distinguishability, but none can be reliably ranked in this high‑distinguishability regime, suggesting that future work should evaluate them on partially private mechanisms.
arXiv:2607. 15512v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Attacks on general computer vision algorithms are often relegated to the digital domain, with the optimization performed purely in the digital world and then translated to physical mediums for implementation.
arXiv:2609.27011v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Target-oriented face de-identification models aim to anonymize the identity of a target individual across different images or video frames, such that t...
EXPL-FR is a lightweight adapter that aligns a vision‑language model’s image encoder with a frozen face‑recognition (FR) embedding space, enabling the FR model to be explained using semantic attribute prompts without any text training. By mapping 978 attribute prompts across 22 categories into the FR space, the method identifies the most detectable concepts—forming a readable semantic signature that better separates identities than the full vocabulary. The approach is evaluated on four FR backbones and two VLM encoders, providing identity‑level, per‑image, and differential explanations, and demonstrates that prompt‑driven audits can rank FR models by per‑ethnicity error and attribute‑change verification cost without requiring labeled data.