arXiv:2607. 17504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers.
By Zhihan Ren, Lijun He, Xinyao Wang, Xinzhu Fu, Fan Li
arXiv:2510. 25687v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model inversion attacks pose an open challenge to privacy-sensitive applications that use machine learning (ML) models.
By Mallika Prabhakar, Louise Xu, Prateek Saxena
arXiv:2607. 29144v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition.
By Pawe{\l} Borsukiewicz, Daniele Lunghi, Wendk\^uuni C. Ou\'edraogo, Jacques Klein, Tegawend\'e F. Bissyand\'e
arXiv:2409. 01062v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model Inversion (MI) attacks pose a significant privacy threat by reconstructing private training data from machine learning models.
By Viet-Hung Tran, Ngoc-Bao Nguyen, Son T. Mai, Hans Vandierendonck, Ira Assent, Alex Kot, Ngai-Man Cheung
arXiv:2608. 08521v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face recognition systems face two distinct, commonly-separated failure modes: spoofing, where an impostor presents a photograph or video of an authorized user, and disguise, where a legitimate user is rejected because their appearance differs from their enrolled template due to accessories, facial hair, illumination, or pose.
By Sangiya Pararajasingham
arXiv:2607. 25926v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face de-identification (De-ID) aims to remove or conceal personally identifiable facial features in images or videos to prevent identity recognition while preserving utility for downstream tasks.
By Hui Wei, Hao Yu, Guoying Zhao