arXiv:2607. 14932v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic face datasets have become effective enough to train face recognition models with accuracy rivaling that of models trained on real photographs.
By Pawe{\l} Borsukiewicz, Daniele Lunghi, Wendk\^uuni C. Ou\'edraogo, Jacques Klein, Tegawend\'e F. Bissyand\'e
Synthetic face datasets have become effective enough to train face recognition models with accuracy rivaling that of models trained on real photographs. This progress sidesteps the ethical and legal burdens of collecting real biometric data, yet evaluation has not kept pace.
arXiv:2607. 13541v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: To overcome data scarcity and privacy constraints in data collection, it has become standard practice across academia and industry to augment real training data with text-to-image (T2I)-generated synthetic data, a paradigm we term Real-Synthetic Mix-Training (RSMT).
By Na Li, Boyu Kuang, Hongsheng Hu, Liquan Chen, Hyoungshick Kim, Yansong Gao, Anmin Fu
arXiv:2603. 10937v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The use of synthetic data has become increasingly popular as a privacy-preserving alternative to sharing real datasets, especially in sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and demography.
By Rajdeep Pathak, Amit Basak, Sayantee Jana
arXiv:2607. 28936v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Facial biometric identification relies on the distinctiveness of user attributes within a high-dimensional embedding space.
By Omid Ahmadieh, Nima Karimian
arXiv:2607. 17504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers.
By Zhihan Ren, Lijun He, Xinyao Wang, Xinzhu Fu, Fan Li
Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers. Existing privacy-preserving face recognition methods mainly aim to resist unauthorized reconstruction, typically producing features whose inversion yields visibly degraded results, which may reveal the existence of protection and motivate adaptive attacks.
arXiv:2606. 11505v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Biometric systems are increasingly deployed in security applications; however, they remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which attackers exploit counterfeit biometric data to gain unauthorized access.
By Kumar Kartikey, Nikos Komninos
arXiv:2606. 06334v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Counterfactuals are typically used in high-stakes decision areas to explain a machine learning model by showing how changes to the user profiles result in the desired outcome.
By Maryam Babaei, Yingke Wang, Hadrien Lautraite, Heber H. Arcolezi, Ulrich Aivodji, Sebastien Gambs
arXiv:2607. 25926v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face de-identification (De-ID) aims to remove or conceal personally identifiable facial features in images or videos to prevent identity recognition while preserving utility for downstream tasks.
By Hui Wei, Hao Yu, Guoying Zhao
arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.
By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock
arXiv:2608. 17147v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Image-to-image face generators are widely used, and visual dissimilarity between their outputs and source images is sometimes treated as evidence of privacy.
By Arman Zareian Jahromi, Vishnu Bondalakunta, Mohammad Akbar Bin Shah, Naimul Haque, Shuangqing Wei, George T. Amariucai