arXiv:2607. 15512v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Attacks on general computer vision algorithms are often relegated to the digital domain, with the optimization performed purely in the digital world and then translated to physical mediums for implementation.
arXiv:2607. 29144v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition.
arXiv:2510. 25687v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model inversion attacks pose an open challenge to privacy-sensitive applications that use machine learning (ML) models.
arXiv:2606. 11505v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Biometric systems are increasingly deployed in security applications; however, they remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which attackers exploit counterfeit biometric data to gain unauthorized access.
arXiv:2608. 08521v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face recognition systems face two distinct, commonly-separated failure modes: spoofing, where an impostor presents a photograph or video of an authorized user, and disguise, where a legitimate user is rejected because their appearance differs from their enrolled template due to accessories, facial hair, illumination, or pose.
arXiv:2607. 25926v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face de-identification (De-ID) aims to remove or conceal personally identifiable facial features in images or videos to prevent identity recognition while preserving utility for downstream tasks.
arXiv:2607. 17504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers.
Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers. Existing privacy-preserving face recognition methods mainly aim to resist unauthorized reconstruction, typically producing features whose inversion yields visibly degraded results, which may reveal the existence of protection and motivate adaptive attacks.
arXiv:2608. 09633v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face presentation attack detection (PAD) aims to reliably detect a wide range of presentation attacks.
arXiv:2607. 14932v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic face datasets have become effective enough to train face recognition models with accuracy rivaling that of models trained on real photographs.
arXiv:2411. 19715v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We describe Forensics Adapter, an adapter network designed to transform CLIP into an effective and generalizable face forgery detector.
arXiv:2607. 22752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face Image Quality Assessment (FIQA) aims to estimate the utility of facial images for reliable recognition.
arXiv:2607. 28936v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Facial biometric identification relies on the distinctiveness of user attributes within a high-dimensional embedding space.