Language‑model agents tend to favor members of their own group because they observe group members favoring each other. When a cost is attached to giving points, the simple group label no longer drives favoritism; instead, interaction history becomes the primary source of bias, with agents extending favoritism to strangers who share the same label. Stronger models prioritize an individual’s own record over group norms, and scripted histories can reduce or reverse favoritism under egalitarian conditions.
By Yujiao Chen
arXiv:2609.35928v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly mix models from several providers, yet exposing each agent's underlying model identity to its peers significantl...
By Xavier Del Giudice, Alessio Palma, Matteo Migliarini, Fabio Galasso, Indro Spinelli
The paper introduces SILICA, an open instrument designed to evaluate whether large language model (LLM) agent societies replicate human behavioural distributions. Using five environments with human‑anchored data and perturbations, the study finds that most LLMs only match human behaviour at initial stages, failing to reproduce end‑state cooperation or correct acceptance thresholds. The results suggest that current LLM societies can support exploratory claims but do not yet reliably emulate human social dynamics.
By Raad Bin Tareaf
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv:2605. 28114v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language-model agents are moving from single-user assistants into persistent networks that build trust and reputation with one another, and the same models increasingly control physically embodied robots as well as software.
By Messi H. J. Lee
The study investigates whether five large language‑model agents adapt their contributions in a collective‑risk dilemma game. Across ten rounds, most models maintained a roughly fixed contribution level regardless of changing risk or partner behavior, and many continued to contribute even when it offered no payoff advantage. The results reveal that cooperative self‑play does not necessarily indicate strategic adaptability, and that agents’ responses to incentives, partner actions, and population composition vary significantly.
By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Phu-Hoa Pham, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv:2606. 30383v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A rapidly growing class of LLM agents is multi-party: the agent acts for a principal (who briefs it, sends follow-ups, and receives results) while also conversing in a separate channel with a counterparty whose interests may diverge (negotiating with a vendor, screening inbound requests, or mediating between employees).
By Bojie Li, Noah Shi
arXiv:2606. 30454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making.
By Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia L\'azaro, Alberto Aleta, Yamir Moreno
arXiv:2608.22152v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Multi-agent systems built from large language models are deployed widely, yet how much performance is lost when two LLMs must coordinate rather than ac...
By Weixiang Sun, Zehong Wang, Hong Huang, Colby Nelson, Yanfang Ye
arXiv:2606. 27909v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives.
By Avni Mittal
The paper investigates how to encourage agents in a multi‑agent game to report unsafe tasks when rewards are shared. It shows that a fully shared policy can be drawn toward silence even when reporting is optimal, and derives audit conditions that guarantee policy‑gradient updates lead to universal reporting. Experiments with PPO on 24 witness graphs demonstrate that grouping witnesses into separate networks reduces unsafe task completion by over 30 percentage points compared to shuffled groups, while a fully shared network only succeeds under a common action draw.
By Avyay M. Casheekar, Hariganesh Tangirala
arXiv:2608. 07762v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM benchmarks can build an organization's reputation and attract customers, but only when results are transparent and verifiable.
By Sahil Pardasani, Madhusudan Singh