arXiv AI By Avyay M. Casheekar, Hariganesh Tangirala

Learning to Report Unsafe Tasks in a Multi-Agent Game

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The paper investigates how to encourage agents in a multi‑agent game to report unsafe tasks when rewards are shared. It shows that a fully shared policy can be drawn toward silence even when reporting is optimal, and derives audit conditions that guarantee policy‑gradient updates lead to universal reporting. Experiments with PPO on 24 witness graphs demonstrate that grouping witnesses into separate networks reduces unsafe task completion by over 30 percentage points compared to shuffled groups, while a fully shared network only succeeds under a common action draw.

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