arXiv:2606. 30383v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A rapidly growing class of LLM agents is multi-party: the agent acts for a principal (who briefs it, sends follow-ups, and receives results) while also conversing in a separate channel with a counterparty whose interests may diverge (negotiating with a vendor, screening inbound requests, or mediating between employees).
arXiv:2606. 14200v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Open platforms increasingly route tasks among heterogeneous LLM agents--differing in base model, scaffold, and tool stack--whose competence varies sharply by skill: an agent excellent at one skill may be useless at another.
arXiv:2606. 00914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts.
The paper studies how to safely delegate action approval to multiple AI reviewers when the reviewers themselves may be misaligned. It introduces a weaker condition—k‑robust coalitional alignment—under which a threshold rule that tolerates up to k disapprovals guarantees that the principal’s expected utility is at least as good as a baseline policy. The authors extend this characterization to sequential decision‑making in discounted MDPs and show that full‑panel coverage of reward functions ensures safety in Nash equilibria, while more permissive thresholds can lead to unsafe outcomes. Experiments demonstrate that collective review can remain sound even when individual reviewers are not fully aligned, provided some disapprovals are allowed.
arXiv:2606. 07834v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM judges increasingly turn verdicts into system commitments.
arXiv:2607. 28814v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In Motivational Interviewing (MI), a client's sustain talk (arguments for the status quo) calls for the counselor to roll with resistance, a move that can fail in two opposite ways: capitulation (abandoning the change agenda to preserve rapport) or confrontation (arguing or directing, overriding the client's autonomy).
arXiv:2607. 15434v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another.
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
The paper introduces "capability laundering," a method where a weaker, unaligned language model splits a harmful task into benign subproblems, consults a stronger aligned model on each, and locally combines the answers. Experiments with GPT‑5.5, Claude Opus 4.8, and Grok‑4.3 as consultants to various local orchestrators show significant uplift on CyBench, BountyBench, and a bioweapon attack chain, with Gemma‑4‑31B recovering many more candidates than the aligned models alone. The results reveal that refusing a harmful task does not stop frontier capabilities from being transferred and composed across multiple permitted interactions.
arXiv:2604. 11840v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Language models are increasingly used to simulate people: survey respondents, negotiators, stakeholders in policy exercises.
arXiv:2608. 06949v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior benchmarking work has shown that a single large language model (LLM), forced to make life-or-death resource-allocation decisions, exhibits measurable demographic bias.
The paper investigates how multi‑agent large language models (LLMs) can correct each other’s mistakes, but also how peer pressure can overturn correct answers. It argues that a safeguard— a ‘brake’ that blocks harmful revisions while allowing beneficial ones— is essentially a correctness probe, and that models’ self‑knowledge (measured by AUROC 0.64–0.89) limits the effectiveness of such a brake. The authors find that even white‑box steering cannot break this ceiling, and that adding information before revision, rather than filtering after, is the more promising approach.
arXiv:2609.35928v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly mix models from several providers, yet exposing each agent's underlying model identity to its peers significantl...