Language-model agents favor their own group because they have watched their members favor each other. The group label alone does little once the decision has a cost; what drives favoritism is observed...
arXiv:2609.35928v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly mix models from several providers, yet exposing each agent's underlying model identity to its peers significantl...
By Xavier Del Giudice, Alessio Palma, Matteo Migliarini, Fabio Galasso, Indro Spinelli
The paper introduces SILICA, an open instrument designed to evaluate whether large language model (LLM) agent societies replicate human behavioural distributions. Using five environments with human‑anchored data and perturbations, the study finds that most LLMs only match human behaviour at initial stages, failing to reproduce end‑state cooperation or correct acceptance thresholds. The results suggest that current LLM societies can support exploratory claims but do not yet reliably emulate human social dynamics.
By Raad Bin Tareaf
arXiv:2605. 28114v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language-model agents are moving from single-user assistants into persistent networks that build trust and reputation with one another, and the same models increasingly control physically embodied robots as well as software.
By Messi H. J. Lee
The study investigates whether five large language‑model agents adapt their contributions in a collective‑risk dilemma game. Across ten rounds, most models maintained a roughly fixed contribution level regardless of changing risk or partner behavior, and many continued to contribute even when it offered no payoff advantage. The results reveal that cooperative self‑play does not necessarily indicate strategic adaptability, and that agents’ responses to incentives, partner actions, and population composition vary significantly.
By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Phu-Hoa Pham, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv:2606. 27909v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives.
By Avni Mittal