arXiv Machine Learning

Incentivize Contribution and Learn Parameters Too: Federated Learning with Strategic Data Owners

The paper proposes mechanisms for federated learning that both incentivize strategic data owners to contribute fully and learn a high‑quality model. The first mechanism, UPBReD, jointly updates client contributions and the model, converging to a Nash equilibrium that may involve under‑contribution. The second mechanism, 2P‑UPBReD, introduces budget‑balanced transfers to make full contribution a dominant strategy, ensuring convergence to the optimal model while guaranteeing that all clients prefer to participate. Subsequent extensions (T‑2P‑UPBReD) further enforce truthful reporting of contributions and gradients without running a deficit, and experiments on CIFAR‑10, FEMNIST, and Twitter demonstrate that 2P‑UPBReD achieves welfare comparable to FedAvg trained on all data.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 15

Pathwise Individual Rationality in Federated Learning: A Mechanism-Architecture Co-Design

The paper investigates the trade‑off between the costs of participating in federated learning (privacy, communication, compute) and the potential gains in model performance, framing this as a game‑theoretic problem of individual rationality versus autarky. It shows that clients can remain below their local‑training baseline for many rounds and that simply capping per‑round contributions harms learning. The authors propose a new mechanism that provides short‑term participation guarantees and personalized model evaluation, demonstrating theoretically and empirically that clients can avoid short‑term losses without significantly harming overall performance, even under moderate heterogeneity.

By Amin Meghrazi, Srinivasan Parthasarathy, Andrew Perrault
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

Stable and Budget-Feasible Coalition Formation for Clustered Federated Learning: A Hedonic Potential-Game Approach

arXiv:2607. 26788v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable.

By Cengis Hasan
arXiv AI
Oct 15

ProAS: A Progress-Aware Advantage Shaping Framework for Multi-Turn Agentic Reinforcement Learning

The paper introduces ProAS, a Progress‑Aware Advantage Shaping framework designed to improve critic‑free reinforcement learning for large language model agents. ProAS uses a dynamic Agentic Reference Graph to provide fine‑grained credit assignment through Masking Unreasonable Incentives and Asymmetric Penalty Redistribution, avoiding the uniform advantage broadcast that can reinforce invalid actions. Experiments on Qwen2.5‑1.5B‑Instruct and Qwen2.5‑7B‑Instruct show that ProAS raises baseline success rates to 91.9% and 94.3% on ALFWorld and 66.7% and 70.8% on WebShop, while speeding up training convergence up to 2.44× and remaining robust to imperfect reference graphs.

By Bowen Ding, Mingda Wan, Yuhan Chen, Jiyao Yuan, Qi Zhu, Futing Wang, Heyuan Deng, Fei Mi, Lifeng Shang, Tao Lin
arXiv AI
2d ago

When the Agent Learns Too: Learning to Incentivize with Unobserved Rewards

The paper studies a repeated principal–agent game where the principal cannot observe the agent’s rewards and both parties learn over time. It introduces a non‑parametric estimator that uses only the history of incentives and choices, and combines it with a data‑driven incentive policy in a multi‑armed bandit setting. The authors prove finite‑sample consistency of the estimator and provide a regret bound for the principal, supported by simulations on green‑energy aggregator contracts.

By Ilgin Dogan, Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Anil Aswani