arXiv:2603. 18385v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS).
arXiv:2512. 10279v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information.
arXiv:2512. 07901v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.
arXiv:2608. 13297v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In evolutionary search, a weak child can be a valuable ancestor that makes high-fitness regions reachable.
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
The paper presents a mean‑field framework for studying multi‑agent Q‑learning in networked populations, where agents update stateless Q‑values on a fixed graph while the average behavior of the population feeds back to modify the payoff matrix. A deterministic transport equation for the distribution of Q‑values is derived and coupled with a discrete update for the environmental state, and the model is validated against Monte Carlo simulations on several random graph topologies. Results show that the mean‑field system captures macroscopic cooperation dynamics, that environmental feedback reshapes action‑value ordering, and that the timescale of environmental response critically influences learning outcomes.
We’ve discovered that evolution strategies (ES), an optimization technique that’s been known for decades, rivals the performance of standard reinforcement learning (RL) techniques on modern RL benchmarks (e. g.
The paper investigates whether evolutionary stability guarantees that learning agents can achieve cooperative outcomes in a multi‑agent setting. Using a three‑agent governance game, the authors compare the evolutionary basin of attraction with learning basins derived from independent Q‑learning, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA–EA BQL. They find that while the evolutionary basin covers the entire sampled grid, only ε‑greedy Q‑learning attains a substantial learning basin, whereas the other methods fail to sustain cooperation, highlighting a disconnect between population‑level stability and finite‑sample learning accessibility.
arXiv:2409. 05980v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Rested and Restless Bandits are two well-known bandit settings that are useful to model real-world sequential decision-making problems in which the expected reward of an arm evolves over time due to the actions we perform or due to the nature.
arXiv:2504.09006v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual...
arXiv:2505. 16388v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun.
arXiv:2512. 07901v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.