arXiv:2603. 18385v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS).
arXiv:2512. 10279v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information.
arXiv:2512. 07901v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.
arXiv:2608. 13297v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In evolutionary search, a weak child can be a valuable ancestor that makes high-fitness regions reachable.
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
We’ve discovered that evolution strategies (ES), an optimization technique that’s been known for decades, rivals the performance of standard reinforcement learning (RL) techniques on modern RL benchmarks (e. g.
arXiv:2409. 05980v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Rested and Restless Bandits are two well-known bandit settings that are useful to model real-world sequential decision-making problems in which the expected reward of an arm evolves over time due to the actions we perform or due to the nature.
arXiv:2505. 16388v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun.
arXiv:2512. 07901v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.
arXiv:2605. 03357v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Mean Field Games (MFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling the collective behavior of large populations of interacting agents.
arXiv:2510. 10895v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols, essential for wireless networks, are typically manually configured.
arXiv:2306. 02704v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce \emph{Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs)}, a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework.