Regret Minimization with Adaptive Opponents in Repeated Games
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
arXiv:2306. 02704v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce \emph{Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs)}, a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework.
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
arXiv:2510. 15824v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This article considers an online version of conformal inference, called adaptive conformal inference [ACI] and introduced by Gibbs and Cand\`es (2021): prediction sets are issued sequentially, after observing features and before the outcomes are revealed.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
arXiv:2603. 00374v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories.
arXiv:2605. 29032v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss.
arXiv:2504.09192v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The primary goal of my Ph.D. study is to develop provably efficient and practical algorithms for data-driven sequential decision-making under uncer...
The paper introduces Regret-Weighted Payoff Sampling (RWPS), a budgeted estimator that selectively simulates only payoff-matrix cells relevant to a Nash equilibrium and uses a surrogate model for the remaining entries. RWPS provides an instance-dependent error bound weighted by the opponent’s equilibrium mixture and a coverage result guaranteeing that, once the deviation-relevant set is simulated, surrogate error does not affect either player’s regret. Experiments on three 21×21 general-sum games, including an asymmetric Colonel Blotto, show that RWPS achieves four to six times tighter bounds than previous methods and outperforms other sampling strategies on the CyGym and ANSG cyber simulators at low budgets.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2606. 08068v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often fail to reliably outperform a single strong model equipped with best-of-N sampling.
arXiv:2406. 13668v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A set of probabilistic forecasts is calibrated if each prediction of the forecaster closely approximates the empirical distribution of outcomes on the subset of timesteps where that prediction was made.
arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.
arXiv:2607. 00164v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability.