arXiv Machine Learning

Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agents

arXiv:2306. 02704v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce \emph{Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs)}, a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework.

arXiv AI
Jul 10

Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games

arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.

By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
arXiv AI
Sep 18

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games

The paper introduces Regret-Weighted Payoff Sampling (RWPS), a budgeted estimator that selectively simulates only payoff-matrix cells relevant to a Nash equilibrium and uses a surrogate model for the remaining entries. RWPS provides an instance-dependent error bound weighted by the opponent’s equilibrium mixture and a coverage result guaranteeing that, once the deviation-relevant set is simulated, surrogate error does not affect either player’s regret. Experiments on three 21×21 general-sum games, including an asymmetric Colonel Blotto, show that RWPS achieves four to six times tighter bounds than previous methods and outperforms other sampling strategies on the CyGym and ANSG cyber simulators at low budgets.

By Michael Lanier, David Farmer, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 17

Breaking the $T^{2/3}$ Barrier for Sequential Calibration

arXiv:2406. 13668v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A set of probabilistic forecasts is calibrated if each prediction of the forecaster closely approximates the empirical distribution of outcomes on the subset of timesteps where that prediction was made.

By Yuval Dagan, Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Noah Golowich, Robert Kleinberg, Princewill Okoroafor
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 15

High-Probability Nash Regret for Decentralized Learning in Markov $\alpha$-Potential Games: Episodic and Fully Online Asynchronous Algorithms with Applications to Markov Congestion Games

arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.

By S. Rasoul Etesami