The paper introduces a prompt‑injection detection framework for email assistants that models attacks as a chain of stages. It combines a text detector, stage‑specific verifiers, rule‑based risk signals, user intent consistency checks, and a logistic decision policy. Experiments on five benchmarks show the framework outperforms pretrained detectors, achieving a mean F1 of 0.406 versus 0.216, and demonstrate that training on benign emails resembling attacks reduces false alarms.
By Ahmad Hashmi, Dhyey Patel, Yunting Yin
arXiv:2511. 12085v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Phishing and related cyber threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with email-based phishing remaining the most persistent attack vector.
By Sajad U P
arXiv:2606. 09411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can be fine-tuned to encode prompt-borne secrets into fluent, seemingly benign outputs.
By Charles Westphal, Timothy Douglas, Keivan Navaie, Tiago Pimentel, Fernando E. Rosas
The paper reports a reproducible study of evasion attacks on image and text classifiers. A compact convolutional network on MNIST achieved 98.63% clean accuracy but dropped to 60.20% under FGSM with ε=0.15 and 1.72% with ε=0.30, while PGD reduced accuracy to 32.47% and 0.41%; a bit‑depth‑reduction defense only partially restored performance. In contrast, a DistilBERT model fine‑tuned on the SMS Spam Collection reached 98.75% accuracy and 94.96% F1‑score, yet a sequence of predefined perturbations produced only modest probability shifts and did not flip spam to ham predictions.
By Parker Hummel (Minot State University), Ryne Skabo (Minot State University), Muhammad Abusaqer (Minot State University)
arXiv:2605. 26595v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison.
By Zedian Shao, Charles Fleming, Teodora Baluta
arXiv:2508.02312v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs), now a foundation in advancing natural language processing, power applications such as text generation, machine...
By Kang Chen, Xiuze Zhou, Yuanhui Yu, Yuanguo Lin, Hefeng Chen, Congyu Cai, Li Shen
arXiv:2607. 28862v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to significant advances across a wide range of language tasks, while simultaneously raising growing concerns about unauthorized data exploitation and privacy leakage.
By Chengshuai Zhao, Pingchuan Ma, Dawei Li, Bohan Jiang, Zhiyuan Yu, Zhen Tan, Huan Liu
arXiv:2608. 04477v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cloud-based language model services routinely process prompts containing sensitive information.
By Zhicong Huang, Cheng Hong, Tao Wei
arXiv:2511.14301v4 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning def...
By Eric Xue, Ruiyi Zhang, Pengtao Xie
The paper introduces a new evaluation setting called scenario‑level out‑of‑distribution (SL‑OOD) detection for SMS and voice phishing, where entire attack scenarios are omitted from training while the label space stays fixed. It shows that high in‑distribution performance does not guarantee robustness to unseen scenarios, attributing this to scenario memorization. The authors propose ECoG, an evidence‑consistent generative framework that uses evidence‑span supervision and a rationale‑label consistency objective, achieving notable improvements in Macro‑F1, reduced prediction‑rationale inconsistency, and higher token‑level overlap with reference evidence.
By San Kim, JinYeong Bak
arXiv:2605. 19262v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Masked diffusion language models (MDLMs) are emerging as a compelling new paradigm for text generation, but their training-time security remains largely unexplored.
By Daniel Yiming Cao, Chengzhong Wang, Sheng-Yen Chou, Chengyu Huang, Pin-Yu Chen, Shengwei An
arXiv:2601. 22818v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fine-tuned LLMs can covertly encode prompt secrets into outputs via steganographic channels.
By Charles Westphal, Keivan Navaie, Fernando E. Rosas