arXiv:2606. 09411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can be fine-tuned to encode prompt-borne secrets into fluent, seemingly benign outputs.
Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2601. 22818v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fine-tuned LLMs can covertly encode prompt secrets into outputs via steganographic channels.
This survey reviews 148 linguistic steganographic methods, 60 countermeasures, 23 evaluation metrics, and 9 open challenges, providing taxonomies, reviews, and adoption analyses. It identifies five paradigm shifts brought by large language models: moving from covertext modification to prompt-only generation, from heuristic to provable security, from white-box symmetric models to black-box or asymmetric access, from security-centric designs to joint optimization, and from text-quality concerns to engineering issues. The paper aims to serve as a reference and roadmap for practical and responsible linguistic steganography in the LLM era.
arXiv:2606. 28425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Increasingly autonomous agentic AI systems pose novel multi-agent risks, such as secret collusion via covert communication channels.
arXiv:2602. 14095v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning.
arXiv:2606. 09135v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We demonstrate that widely deployed Large Language Model (LLM) inference stacks harbor a steganographic channel that requires no modification to model weights, sampling code, or output distributions.
arXiv:2511.14301v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning def...