arXiv AI

RAG-PIBench: A Leakage-Aware Benchmark for Prompt-Injection Detection in Trustworthy RAG Systems

arXiv AI
Sep 16

RAG-CT: Mitigating Privacy Risks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems via Scanning Prompt Distribution

RAG-CT is a defense mechanism designed to protect Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems from leaking personally identifiable information (PII). It works by detecting malicious queries through analysis of entropy and margin distributions, applying a score-based detection method. Experiments across four attack strategies and four baseline defenses on two datasets show that RAG-CT significantly reduces PII leakage while outperforming existing defenses, all without altering the underlying LLM or retriever.

By Xingyu Lyu, Jiayimei Wang, Jianfeng He, Ning Wang, Yidan Hu, Yimin Chen
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 27

Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

The paper surveys attacks and defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), a technique that improves large language models by grounding outputs in external knowledge. It identifies new robustness and security risks such as corpus poisoning, backdoor attacks, privacy leakage, and fairness violations, and notes that existing surveys inadequately cover attacker objectives, threat models, and stage-specific defenses. The survey offers a unified, pipeline-aware overview, formalizing threat models across the corpus, retriever, and generator, categorizing attacks by accuracy, privacy, and fairness, and reviewing defenses for retrieval, rerank, generation, and traceback stages, while also summarizing robustness benchmarks and explainability methods.

By Minh Tran, Cuong Dang, Tuc Nguyen, Khanh-Tung Tran, Minh Huynh Nguyen, Trinh Chau, Kien Le, Do Xuan Long, Jiahao Zhang, Hoang D. Nguyen, Thanh Le, Suhang Wang
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 27

A Layered Security Framework Against Prompt Injection in RAG-Based Chatbots

The paper introduces a three‑layer security framework designed to protect retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) chatbots from both direct and indirect prompt injection attacks. Layer 1 filters user input with rule‑based patterns and a semantic anomaly classifier; Layer 2 enforces a provenance‑based instruction hierarchy during context assembly; Layer 3 audits model output with a policy rule engine and semantic drift detector. Evaluations on GPT‑4o, Llama 3, and Mistral 7B demonstrate a reduction in attack success rate from 71.4 % to 11.3 %, outperforming existing single‑layer defenses while keeping false positives low and latency acceptable.

By Gulshan Saleem, Nisar Ahmed, Muhammad Imran Zaman, Ali Hassan, Umar Mujahid
arXiv AI
Aug 11

Defending Retrieval-Augmented Intrusion Detection Against Knowledge Poisoning and Prompt Injection

arXiv:2608. 08100v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables large language models to classify network flows and generate human-readable incident reports by retrieving semantically similar historical traffic from a vector knowledge base.

By Kaysarul Anas Apurba, Md. Hasibul Hasan, Mahedee Zaman Moon, Sk. Md. Mizanur Rahman, Atsuo Inomata
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Trustworthy RAG: An Evaluation Agent for Detecting Misinformation and Knowledge Poisoning in Generative AI Systems

The paper introduces Trustworthy RAG, an evaluation agent designed to detect misinformation and knowledge poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation systems. It combines natural language inference verification, a five-signal poison detector, and a weighted Trust Index to assess the reliability of retrieved content. Experiments on multiple LLMs show high accuracy and precision, with the agent effectively blocking unsafe advice in a secure-coding assistant scenario.

By Balkrishna Giri, Md Toufique Hasan, Jussi Rasku, Muhammad Waseem, Pekka Abrahamsson