arXiv Machine Learning August 11, 2026 By Laiqiao Qin, Tianqing Zhu, Longxiang Gao, Wanlei Zhou

BASIS: Breach-Aware Selective Prompt Injection Shielding with Prefill Attention Probes

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

arXiv:2608. 08027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data.

Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.

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