arXiv:2608. 01454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDS) frequently report strong performance, but the conclusions drawn from these results can be highly sensitive to benchmarking choices and evaluation protocols.
By Lorenzo Guerra, Thomas Chapuis, Guillaume Duc, Pavlo Mozharovskyi, Van-Tam Nguyen
arXiv:2604. 08304v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) extends large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge, but this access path also introduces security risks that existing work often conflates with inherent LLM flaws.
By Yuming Xu, Mingtao Zhang, Zhuohan Ge, Haoyang Li, Nicole Hu, Yongqi Zhang, Zhiyuan Wen, Jason Chen Zhang, Qing Li, Lei Chen
arXiv:2606. 18310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Injecting malicious knowledge into retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems can manipulate retrieved evidence and mislead downstream generation, posing a serious security threat for AI applications.
By Xinru Liu, Xianglong Zhang, Di Cai, Zhumin Chen, Pengfei Hu, Xin Xin
arXiv:2607. 00012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances Large Language Models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge, effectively mitigating their inherent knowledge limitations.
By Xue Tan, Yi Zheng, Chang Huo, Yunruo Zhang, Yu Liu, Hao Luan, Zhuyang Yu, Xiaoyan Sun, Ping Chen, Jun Dai
arXiv:2608. 02678v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning: an attacker who inserts a crafted document into the retrieval corpus can steer the underlying large language model (LLM) toward an attacker-chosen wrong answer.
By Abay Zhurekbay, Tao Liu, Fan Li
arXiv:2606. 11265v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection.
By Xi Nie, Hongwei Li, Shenghao Wu, Mingxuan Li, Jiachen Li, Wenbo Jiang