arXiv:2609.37669v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is increasingly used to enhance Large Language Model (LLM)-based software vulnerability detection by grounding p...
By Sabrina Kaniewski, Tim Kr\"amer, Julius B\"achle, Markus Enzweiler, Michael Menth, Tobias Heer
arXiv:2608. 12246v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating security vulnerability detection tools requires benchmark datasets with vulnerability-inducing commits (VICs) - the commits that first introduce vulnerabilities into codebases.
By Jin Lu, Xuening Han, Yang Zhong, Lin Tan, Kevin Luo, Andrew Gacek, Neha Rungta
arXiv:2606. 15123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the task of CVE-conditioned exploit generation, where a model drafts proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits given software vulnerability context.
By Yiwei Chen, Lichi Li, Kai Cheung, Vinny Parla, Ganesh Sundaram
Evaluating security vulnerability detection tools requires benchmark datasets with vulnerability-inducing commits (VICs) - the commits that first introduce vulnerabilities into codebases. VICs are essential for determining the full range of vulnerable software versions.
arXiv:2606. 19149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automated vulnerability discovery in large codebases remains challenging: traditional static analysis produces high false-positive rates, while dynamic approaches such as fuzzing require substantial infrastructure and often target narrow classes of bugs.
By Nahum Korda, Gadi Evron
arXiv:2605. 13138v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Automated detection of vulnerability-fixing commits (\vfcs) is critical for timely security patch deployment, as advisory databases lag patch releases by a median of 25 days and many fixes never receive advisories.
By Nils Loose, Joseph Bienh\"uls, Kristoffer Hempel, Felix M\"achtle, Thomas Eisenbarth
arXiv:2606. 31159v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming software development, yet their use in security-critical contexts raises a key question: do models know when their generated code is insecure?
By Mohammed Latif Siddiq, Md. Nafiu Rahman, Joanna C. S. Santos
The paper introduces CodeScan, a black-box, vulnerability-oriented scanning framework designed to detect data poisoning and backdoor attacks in code generation large language models (LLMs). CodeScan operates by analyzing structural similarities across multiple code generations, normalizing them with abstract syntax tree (AST) techniques, and then applying LLM-based vulnerability analysis to identify recurring insecure patterns. Evaluations on 117 models across three architectures and multiple sizes show over 97% detection accuracy with fewer false positives compared to prior methods.
By Shenao Yan, Shan Jin, Shimaa Ahmed, Sunpreet Singh Arora, Yiwei Cai, Yizhen Wang, Yuan Hong
arXiv:2605. 26548v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finding a real vulnerability in complicated systems is a challenging, long-horizon task that demands reasoning across an entire codebase to produce a working proof-of-concept (PoC).
By Hwiwon Lee, Jiawei Liu, Dongjun Kim, Wubing Xia, Ziqi Zhang, Chunqiu Steven Xia, Lingming Zhang
arXiv:2606. 17283v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Achieving reproducibility, quantity, and diversity in vulnerability datasets has long been viewed as an inherent three-way trade-off, where improving one dimension often comes at the cost of the others.
By Xiang Mei, Jordi Del Castillo, Pulkit Singh Singaria, Haoran Xi, Abdelouahab Benchikh, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Adam Doup\'e, Hammond Pearce, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt
arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...
By Jiahao Shi, Edward Tsien, Yifeng Di, Hongjiao Zhang, Yuan Tang, Ronit Dey, Ilona Shishov, Gal Netanel, Zvi Grinberg, Vladimir Belousov, Bat-Zion Rotman, Ilan Pinto, Tianyi Zhang
The paper introduces CodePoisonRAG, a framework that poisons retrieval-augmented code generation systems by transforming benign code artifacts into malicious ones. It injects CWE-specific vulnerabilities and false safety claims into a single task-matched artifact, achieving high success rates across multiple generators and even against a defense system. The study demonstrates that attackers can target and propagate specific weaknesses without altering the underlying language model.
By Varun Gadey, Ziad Marey, Alexandra Dmitrienko