arXiv:2608. 14795v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: An AI that can only give advice seems safe: the human is always free to ignore it.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2606. 00914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts.
A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures? Skill retirement is the structural constraint that keeps a growing library from drifting below the no-skill baseline, but its guarantee assumes an unbiased reward, which is false for the LLM judges that reference-free tasks force upon us.
arXiv:2607. 07436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures?
arXiv:2606. 19831v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Aligned language models gate behaviors such as refusal and language routing through sparse feed forward neurons, yet no theory predicts when a single neuron intervention controls a behavior coherently rather than collapsing the output.
arXiv:2607. 02755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Training AIs to be risk-averse in resources could offer a failsafe in the event that AIs turn out misaligned.
arXiv:2603. 13356v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Robust reinforcement learning typically assumes that feedback sources are either globally trustworthy or corrupted within a fixed global budget.
arXiv:2607. 25152v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-running autonomous agents plan, act, and judge their own completion without human intervention.
arXiv:2607. 06503v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable.
Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable. We show that failure is predictable early from the agent's internal representations: lightweight per-round probes on hidden activations anticipate eventual episode failure as early as the first interaction round, where scorers reading only the agent's observable behavior are barely better than chance.
arXiv:2607. 07435v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agents acting on our behalf in the real world (e.
A language model's memory can be worse than having no memory at all. Give a model a memory that kept a wrong conclusion but dropped the work behind it, and it emits that stale value as a confident answer; give the same model an empty memory and it abstains.