arXiv:2606. 19831v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Aligned language models gate behaviors such as refusal and language routing through sparse feed forward neurons, yet no theory predicts when a single neuron intervention controls a behavior coherently rather than collapsing the output.
arXiv:2607. 25907v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation steering controls model behavior by editing internal activations at inference time.
arXiv:2607. 25270v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation steering controls language models by adding vectors or features to hidden states at inference time, but the upstream source of these steering signals is often treated as a secondary detail.
arXiv:2608. 01548v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language-first intelligence is constrained by which distinctions enter its symbolic record, which mappings its language--interpreter--environment complex can execute, and which possibilities can be realized with finite resources.
Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering).
arXiv:2608. 06578v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier language models are trained using distinct data, objectives, and safety pipelines.
arXiv:2606. 12923v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI alignment, interpretability, steering, and neural perturbation studies identify order-inducing objects.
arXiv:2602. 06941v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models can recover mid-generation from task-misaligned activation steering, producing explicit verbal restarts (e.
arXiv:2606. 11599v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation steering offers a lightweight approach to control language models' behavior at inference time, but whether it succeeds or fails heavily depends on the prompt, concept, model, and steering configuration.
arXiv:2607. 14147v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Aligned language models refuse harmful requests, but a one-line prefill ("Sure, here is") strips the refusal.
arXiv:2608. 14465v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A frozen language model on reasoning tasks has two coupled weaknesses: it under-uses evidence its own residual stream already encodes, and it fails to detect when the input is insufficient to answer, so it confabulates.
arXiv:2606. 12923v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI alignment, interpretability, steering, and neural perturbation studies identify order-inducing objects.
arXiv:2606. 29441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists.