arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
By Emre Turan
arXiv:2607. 06503v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable.
By Kai Ruan, Zihe Huang, Ziqi Zhou, Qianshan Wei, Xuan Wang, Hao Sun
Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable. We show that failure is predictable early from the agent's internal representations: lightweight per-round probes on hidden activations anticipate eventual episode failure as early as the first interaction round, where scorers reading only the agent's observable behavior are barely better than chance.
arXiv:2607. 07436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures?
By Xing Zhang, Yanwei Cui, Guanghui Wang, Ziyuan Li, Wei Qiu, Bing Zhu, Peiyang He
arXiv:2608. 06949v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior benchmarking work has shown that a single large language model (LLM), forced to make life-or-death resource-allocation decisions, exhibits measurable demographic bias.
By Paul-Peter Arslan
arXiv:2604. 08169v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization.
By Niklas Herbster, Martin Zborowski, Alberto Tosato, Gauthier Gidel, Tommaso Tosato