arXiv AI By Lan Wei, Bingyu Shen, Jiaqi Tang, Qing Lu, Kuan Huang, Meng Xu, Miles Q. Li, Bin Hu, Boyang Li

Who May Release an Agent's Promise? Standing over Commitments in Multi-Party Chat

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The paper investigates who can cancel an AI assistant’s promise in a multi‑party chat setting, defining a concept called standing. Experiments across six language models show that only the creditor or an authorized party should release a commitment, yet many models either incorrectly release promises (unauthorized release) or continue to execute them after release (override). The study finds that larger models are more compliant, that oracles can reduce unauthorized releases, and that adding a commitment ledger or a concise release policy significantly improves compliance.

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arXiv AI
Oct 9

Empty Commitments: When Agents Promise What They Cannot Deliver

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arXiv Machine Learning
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